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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EXCESS:
REVIVING THE JUDICIAL DUTY OF
THE SUPREME COURT
Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton†
Independence from extrinsic influence is, we know, indispensable  to
public trust in the integrity of professional judges who share the duty to de-
cide cases according to preexisting law.  But such independence is less appro-
priate for those expected to make new law to govern future events.  Indeed, in
a democratic government those who make new law are expected to be account-
able to their constituents, not independent of their interests and unresponsive
to their desires.  The Supreme Court of the United States has in the last
century largely forsaken responsibility for the homely task of deciding cases in
accord with preexisting law and has settled into the role of a superlegislature
devoted to making new law to govern future events.  Citizens who see our
judges as primarily engaged in this political role are understandably less
tolerant of their claim to independence and are more intent on holding them
to account for unwelcome decisions.  Such popular dissatisfaction, or even
unrest, with our judiciary is a source of prudent concern expressed by Jus-
tices, among others.  This Article responds to that shared concern with a
proposal to restore the Supreme Court to a more purely judicial role by reviv-
ing the duty of Justices to decide cases.  It would require the Court to decide
numerous cases certified by a group of experienced lower federal court judges
as the cases most in need of their judicial attention.  This proposal is in-
tended not only to strengthen the claim to independence of the Supreme
Court, but also that of other courts subject to its leadership.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer initi-
ated a campaign to elevate public concern for the independence of
our judiciary.1  In 2006–07, they presided at two law school confer-
ences,2 and Justice O’Connor made a presentation to the Conference
on the Public Good held by the American Academy of Arts and Sci-
ences.3  Their efforts resulted in a worthy symposium in the Georgetown
Law Journal celebrating the need to protect our judges from improper
incentives.4
Justices Breyer and O’Connor are of course correct that
judicial independence is indispensable to public trust in the integrity
of government.  Judges must be required and helped to main-
tain personal disinterest in the cases they decide.  The Justices
are also correct that the American public has in recent years
manifested growing mistrust of its judiciary.5  United States
1 Press Release, S. Methodist Univ. Dedman Sch. of Law, Justices O’Connor, Breyer
Host Conference at Dedman School of Law (Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://www.law.
smu.edu/news/04-04-07.aspx.
2 Id.; Press Release, Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Fair and Independent Courts: A
Conference on the State of the Judiciary (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.law.ge-
orgetown.edu/news/events/conference_story.html.
3 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Panel Discussion at the American Academy of Arts &
Sciences Conference: The Public Good, The Independence of the Courts (Apr. 28, 2007)
(audio recording available at http://www.amacad.org/audio/publicgood.aspx).
4 Symposium, Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary, 95
GEO. L.J. 895 (2007).  Other journals have also held conferences and symposia and pub-
lished multiple articles on the subject. See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of
the Organized Bar in State Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV.
683 (2002); William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 53 SMU L. REV. 255 (2000); Symposium, Judicial Elections: Selecting Judges
in the 21st Century, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 437 (2002); Symposium, Judicial Independence and
Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1999); Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accounta-
bility, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998.
5 See generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006).  For expressions of the hos-
tility, see ROBERT H. DIERKER JR., THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE: A SITTING JUDGE BREAKS THE
CODE OF SILENCE TO EXPOSE THE LIBERAL JUDICIAL ASSAULT (2006); EDWIN VIEIRA, HOW TO
DETHRONE THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY (2004); JUDICIAL TYRANNY: THE NEW KINGS OF AMERICA
(Mark I. Sutherland ed., 2005).  For other recent observations, see Robert F. Nagel, Limit-
ing the Court by Limiting Life Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 127 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); Berle M. Schil-
ler, Reducing Conflict Between Congress and the Judiciary, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2005, at 26.  For
earlier observations, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, at vii (1997); N.
Lee Cooper, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Remarks at Opening Session of the American Law
Institute (May 19, 1997), in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REMARKS AND ADDRESSES 21,
24–28 (1997); Herbert M. Kritzer & John Voelker, Familiarity Breeds Respect: How Wisconsin
Citizens View Their Courts, 82 JUDICATURE 59, 60 (1998). But see John M. Scheb II & William
Lyons, Public Perception of the Supreme Court in the 1990s, 82 JUDICATURE 66, 66 (1998) (stating
that surveys from 1994 and 1997 show that the public has a positive perception of the
Court).  For a recent empirical measurement, see Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hen-
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Senators6 as well as local politicians7 have expressed this sentiment
and other Justices have observed it.8  It was brightly displayed in the
2005 congressional effort to reverse the judicial judgment allowing
termination of the life of Terri Schiavo,9 in the academic defense of
that legislation,10 and also in the rhetoric of evangelist Pat Robertson,
who reportedly said that liberal judges are a greater threat to America
than a few bearded terrorists.11  Mistrust of the judiciary is also highly
visible in the vigor of controversies over the nomination and confir-
mation of Justices and judges,12 in serious proposals to remove judges
who make decisions that legislators disapprove of,13 and in judicial
politics at the state level.14
But, there is a measure of irony in the role of Supreme Court
Justices as leaders of this cause for independence.  It is unlikely that
any judge ever sat on a law court enjoying more independence than
the present Justices themselves have enjoyed.  The present Court’s
lawmaking decisions have evoked many of the reactions underlying
nessy, Public Understanding of and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899
(2007).
6 Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to “Political” Decisions: “Unaccountable” Judi-
ciary Raises Ire, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at A7 (quoting Sen. John Cornyn).
7 The extreme referendum proposed to the voters in South Dakota in 2006 would
have stripped judges of their immunity from liability for decisions deemed to be incorrect.
Bob von Sternberg, Campaign 2006: South Dakota State’s Abortion Ban Only One Issue on a
Crowded Ballot, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 1, 2006, at 14A, LexisNexis Academic.
8 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal
Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006); Adam Liptak, Public Comments by Justices Veer Toward
the Political, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at 22.
9 Act of March 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15.  The ultimate decision was
reported in Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005), and the
court quite properly held that Congress was not constitutionally empowered to reverse a
judicial decision denying federal jurisdiction over the matter of medical care. Id. at
1280–82.  Edward A. Hartnett suggests that Congress may have been sending the federal
courts a message in enacting the Schiavo legislation. See Edward A. Hartnett, Congress
Clears Its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553, 584 (2005)
10 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted by
Congress and President Bush, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 151 (2006). But see George J. Annas, “I Want
to Live”: Medicine Betrayed by Ideology in the Political Debate over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L.
REV. 49 (2005); Kathy L. Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political Culture
Wars in Schiavo, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 279 (2007).
11 Pamela A. MacLean, Fearing Backlash, Judges Go Public: Nasty Campaigns and the Gay
Marriage Ruling Lead to First Forum, NAT’L L.J., July 14, 2008, at 5.
12 See BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN AN-
GRY TIMES (2006).
13 See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116
YALE L.J. 72 (2006); see also James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1227 (2007) (responding to Prakash and Smith); Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial
Independence, and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139 (2006)
(same).
14 See David Rottman, The State Courts in 2005: A Year of Living Dangerously, 38 THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 237 (Keon S. Chi ed., 2006).
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the mistrust that the Justices now propose to correct.15  To add to the
irony, as we briefly note below, the Justices have indulged their inde-
pendence to make law that has seriously impaired the independence
of the many judges sitting on state courts.16
We here advance a proposal to amend laws, enacted by Congress
from 1891 to 1988, that give the Court virtually absolute control over
its docket.17  The current measure of control has transformed the
Court so that it is no longer a traditional law court structured to de-
cide disputes, but, as Judge Richard Posner has described it, a
“superlegislature” that sits chiefly to proclaim new law to govern fu-
ture transactions and relations.18  It is therefore no wonder that there
is unrest among citizens mindful of the large political role that the
Court has come to perform and has led other courts to replicate.  Al-
though this unrest has centered on the Court’s proclamation of a
woman’s right to abort a fetus, the Court has in recent times made
new law on many other important topics of deep concern to citizens,
with minimal regard for preexisting constitutional or statutory texts.
A very recent example of superlegislation is the Court’s decision inval-
idating the gun-control law enacted by the elected government of the
15 A balanced assessment drawing on empirical work is DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM
CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (7th ed. 2005).  A less qualified ac-
count is ROBERT E. RIGGS, CORRUPTED BY POWER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITU-
TION (2004).
16 See infra Part II.
17 The idea of discretionary review was first introduced by an 1891 Act. See Judiciary
Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827–28.  This early enactment limited discretionary re-
view to appeals from decisions of the courts of appeals that did not present a constitutional
issue, the interpretation of a treaty, an admiralty prize, a serious crime, or a question of
federal jurisdiction. Id.  These limitations left scant room for discretionary appellate juris-
diction.  The discretion was extended by the Judiciary Act of 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726,
and again by the Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.  By these stages, Congress
extended appellate discretion to all cases. See 39 Stat. at 727–28; 43 Stat. at 937–39.  And so
with trivial exceptions, the Court now decides only those cases it chooses to decide, and
indeed only those issues raised in those cases that it deems worthy of its attention. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1253–54, 1258–59 (2006).  On the legislative history of the 1925 Act, see
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 86–102 (Transaction Publishers 2007) (1928); Edward A.
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649–1704 (2000); Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to Decide: The
Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Discretionary Court, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1 (2008).  Hartnett, supra,
also records later revisions expanding the power.  Opposition to the idea was forcefully
expressed by eminent Senator Thomas J. Walsh (D.–Mont.). See Thomas J. Walsh, The
Overburdened Supreme Court, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 216 passim (John B. Minor ed., 1922).  On the remnant of
mandatory jurisdiction, see Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme
Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 752–53 (2001); see also Bennett Boskey &
Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 97
(1989).
18 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 32, 35–39, 60 (2005) (describing the way in which the Supreme Court is in
the process of becoming a political court).
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District of Columbia.19  Judge Posner20 and Judge Harvie Wilkinson21
have both recognized the decision as one no more rooted in a preex-
isting constitutional text than was the Court’s work on a woman’s
right to choose.  It is an offense to those many citizens who strongly
favor gun control laws.
A significant element in the Court’s role as superlegislature is leg-
islation allowing Justices to decide only those few legal and political
issues that they choose to decide.  Staffs of respectful young law clerks
support the Justices and bear much of the workload of identifying the
considerations to be weighed in choosing cases and of crafting their
proclamations of law.22  Many of those young law clerks have since
matured into professors of constitutional law, tending to nourish the
idolatry of the Court, expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist who was
himself a former law clerk, when he identified his Court as a “crown
jewel” of our profession and our law.23
We here propose to assign veteran circuit judges to replace some
of the young law clerks and to empower those judges to indepen-
dently designate a substantial, fixed number of cases that the Justices
would be obliged to decide each year.24  Our proposal is intended as a
19 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 1695 (2008).
20 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32.
21 J. Harvie Winkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009).
22 For an illustrative analysis of the substantive influence of law clerks in one case, see
Helen J, Knowles, Clerkish Control of Recent Supreme Court Opinions? A Case Study of Justice
Kennedy’s Opinion in Gonzales vs. Carhart, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2009).
23 William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at Washington College of Law
Centennial Celebration at American University: The Future of the Federal Courts (Apr. 9,
1996) (transcript available at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/rehnau96.htm)
[hereinafter Remarks on the Future of Federal Courts]; cf. William H. Rehnquist, The No-
tion of A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976) (stating that if the authority to
declare laws unconstitutional is not strictly tied to the language of the Constitution, judges
would be a “a small group of fortunately situated people with a roving commission to sec-
ond-guess Congress”).
24 The present authors have elsewhere advanced, or will advance, two other proposals
to reform the Supreme Court to moderate the supremacy of Justices without impairing
their independence.  One would limit them to long terms in office. See Paul D. Carrington
& Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic Principles, in RE-
FORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURTS JUSTICES, supra note 5, at 467.  An R
eminent group of law professors, bar leaders, and former chief justices of state supreme
courts who approved the scheme “in principle” is listed in Paul D. Carrington & Roger C.
Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An Introduction to REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIM-
ITS FOR SUPREME COURTS JUSTICES, supra note 5, at 3, 5–7.  The second would extend to R
Supreme Court Justices the system of accountability for breaches of professional responsi-
bility that is imposed on all other Article III judges. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C.
Cramton, Original Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for Justices, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099397.
Our three proposals are not interdependent and are not here presented together for con-
sideration as a new judiciary act.  But if Congress adopted all three proposals, it would not
have in the least impaired the independence of the Justices in their judicial role of decid-
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constructive response to the situation presently concerning Justices
Breyer and O’Connor.  It would remind the Justices that elected legisla-
tors are our primary lawmakers and would moderate the office of Su-
preme Court Justice to a more human, less divine, scale.25  We would
hope that it might help to induce the Court to accept a more modest
political role, one more fitting to the constitutional schemes of separa-
tion of powers and federalism.  Our proposal might also help to re-
store the public sense that the Justices, and other law judges as well,
are bound by the laws they have been chosen to administer.
I
A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COURT’S ASCENSION
Before considering the present proposal in greater detail, a brief
reminder of its historical context is in order.  In 1891, Congress en-
acted a Judiciary Act26 that Senator William Evarts and Congressman
David Culberson advanced and that Culberson explained as aiming to
“overthrow . . . the kingly power” of federal district and circuit
judges.27  At the time of the enactment, Congress was concerned with
the excesses of judicial discretion vested in federal trial judges that
had resulted from the weakness of a system of appellate review that
depended entirely on the Supreme Court.  The new act created the
courts of appeals to provide needed review of district courts and
thereby reduce dependence on a Supreme Court burdened by an
overloaded docket.28
As Justice Felix Frankfurter and James Landis observed in their
salute to the 1891 Act, “great judiciary acts, unlike great poems, are
not written for all time.”29  The system of discretionary review by the
Supreme Court that was established in 1891 was substantially ex-
tended in 1925 to cover most of the Court’s docket.30  By this tech-
nique, the objectionable “kingly power” was, over the ensuing
decades, relocated to the crest of the federal appellate system.  The
Supreme Court increasingly proclaims constitutional law with ex-
tended social and political consequences, while it delegates to others
more onerous or less glamorous duties, such as the correction of mere
ing contested cases; Congress would have instead fulfilled its duty to provide “checks and
balances.”
25 On the independent importance of that aim, see Nagel, supra note 5, passim; Rob- R
ert F. Bauer, A Court Too Supreme for Our Good, WASH. POST., Aug. 7, 2005, at B3.
26 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 17, R
at 220–94 (explaining the story behind the enactment).
27 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890).
28 See 26 Stat. at 826–30.
29 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 17, at 107 (“It is enough if the designers of new R
judicial machinery meet the chief needs of their generation.”).
30 See id. at 220–94.
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errors, that the Justices prefer not to perform.  The Court has thus
emerged as the “ascendant branch” of the national government,31 and
the courts of appeals are similarly freed to imagine themselves as re-
gional semi-superlegislatures, making “the law of the circuit.”  Impor-
tant judicial duties have been increasingly delegated down the chain
of command, and the transparency of the judicial process has substan-
tially declined at all levels.
The present times therefore call again for the sort of leadership
that Senator Evarts and Congressman Culberson provided in 1891.
Congress has long neglected its duty to check and balance the judicial
branch.  This is not a new observation.  There have been no fewer
than five independent studies over the last four decades by eminent
professional groups that have each unanimously concluded that the
relationship of the Supreme Court to the lower courts is in need of
repair.32  We have drawn on those studies in fashioning our more
modest proposal to make the power of Justices less “kingly.”  We pray
that the time has at last come for the successors to Senator Evarts and
Congressman Culberson to emerge and respond to an enduring prob-
lem.  If Congress does not consider our more modest proposal, then
perhaps it might reconsider one of those earlier advanced.
The difference between a law court and a legislature was more
clearly drawn and maintained in the eighteenth century, when Ameri-
can legal institutions took form.  In that time, appellate judges did not
write opinions of the court proclaiming the law but orally expressed
their reactions to legal arguments and thereby acknowledged what
they perceived to be the preexisting law.  They left it to a reporter and
his readers to derive any legal principles that they might have ex-
pressed in their diverse and unrehearsed utterances, a system Tenny-
son depicted as “a lawless science,” a “codeless myriad of precedent,”
31 Court Is the “Ascendant” Branch, for Now, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at C7 (quoting
ex–Solicitor General Seth Waxman).
32 AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEALS (1968) (Carrington served as director of this study); Comm’n on Revision of
the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change,
67 F.R.D. 195, 204–08 (1975) (Cramton was a member of this Commission); Study Group
on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, Report, 57 F.R.D. 573, 577–84 (1972) (prepared for
the Federal Judicial Center); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNA-
TIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993); Comm’n on Structural Alternatives for
the Fed. Courts of Appeals, Final Report (1998), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/
gpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf (discussing the ways in which courts of appeals can adapt to
transform in this new environment).  Our three proposals are less dramatic than any of
those five earlier proposals, each of which had the unanimous support of eminent groups
that included presidents of the American Bar Association, distinguished scholars, federal
judges, a chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a former Supreme Court Justice.
Despite this support, none of their proposals for reform have gained the serious attention
of Congress.
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and a mere “wilderness of single instances.”33  This expectation of a
restrained judicial role supplied the basis on which the virtue of judi-
cial independence was recognized and proclaimed.  To gain the ac-
ceptance of unsuccessful disputants, the judges deciding their cases
need to appear to be personally disinterested in the outcomes.34  But,
no theory of politics or law enables elected legislators to make law ad-
vancing the future interests and relationships of constituents and to
maintain a similar disinterest in the consequences of the laws they
make.  When judges assume the role of lawmakers, as when they im-
part principles into the Constitution that have scant textual basis, or
when they choose to disregard or stretch the text of valid legislation,
they invite political accountability of the sort to which we subject our
legislators.  The absence of such accountability is, we perceive, a cause
of the unrest exciting the attention of Justices Breyer and O’Connor.
Excessive independence for Justices in a position of lawmaking is
taken by many as an offense against the traditions of democratic self-
government.35
Although some Anti-federalists suspected that Supreme Court
Justices might become too independent,36 the Federalist Founders
who wrote Article III of the Constitution evidently did not foresee the
Supreme Court as a superlegislature.  The judges they knew merely
decided contested cases in the common law tradition familiar to
them.  True, judges in colonial and most state courts made a little law,
but they did so unself-consciously as they tried to apply precedent.37
So long as they made law only in that modest common law way, they
33 ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, Aylmer’s Field, (1793), in THE POETIC AND DRAMATIC WORKS
OF ALFRED LORD TENNYSON 240, 246 (Houghton Mifflin 1898) (see lines 435–37
specifically).
34 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007), available at http://www.
abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf (“A judge shall uphold and promote
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety.”).
35 See ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 152–54
(2d ed. 2003) (arguing that when a court deals with issues of fundamental rights, its ac-
tions carries legitimacy with it, but if it moves outside of this realm its actions become more
dubious); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 123–39 (2006).  For a
highly partisan expression of substantive grievances against the Court, see THE MOST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH: THE JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN CULTURE (Edward B. McLean ed.,
2008).
36 One pamphlet protested: “There is no power above them, to controul any of their
decisions.  There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by
the laws of the legislature.  In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature,
and of every power under heaven.”  Essays of Brutus No. XV, Mar. 20, 1788, in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
37 See generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 52–53 (1941)
(arguing that there was little law for judges to make because of the existence of a natural
law that a person could follow simply by following his self-interest). The common law
doctrine of precedent was thus addressed to judges as users rather than as makers of law.
As Edmund Burke explained: “We ought to understand [the law] according to our mea-
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were indeed, as Alexander Hamilton assured us, “the least dangerous”
branch.38  One might fear or resent their power over disputants, but
they were not viewed as makers of potentially unwelcome social policy
governing the future.
That began to change at the federal level in 1801 with the ap-
pointment of John Marshall as Chief Justice.  Chief Justice Marshall’s
first decision came in the form of a written opinion of the Court
signed by all the Justices.39  Writing such an opinion is a deliberate
legislative act quite different from what those who created the Court
had envisioned.  The importance of the device in elevating the judi-
cial power was confirmed by its immediate adoption by all state courts
and, before long, by courts of other nations, including England.40
Combined with the unquestioned constitutional power to invalidate
legislation, the opinions of the Court became the source of constitu-
tional doctrine, making the Justices the authors and sometime amend-
ers of a constitution that is an extension of the text written in 1787.
The constitution that the Supreme Court expresses in its opinions is
almost impossible to amend by the democratic process set forth in
Article V if the Court’s decision bears on an issue on which significant
sure; and to venerate where we are not able presently to comprehend.” EDMUND BURKE,
AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS 116 (London, Pall-Mall, 2d ed. 1791).
38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that “the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of
power”); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962) (arguing that the supposed “least dangerous
branch” is in fact “the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever
known”).  Montesquieu put it most strongly: “Of the three powers above-mentioned, the
judiciary is in some measure next to nothing.” MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 221
(Thomas Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse & P. Vaillant, 3d ed. 1758).
39 A Supreme Court opinion first appeared in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1
(1801). See generally GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–15, in 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 207–45 (Paul E. Freund ed., 1981) (explaining the
political situation surrounding the federal judiciary during the time John Marshall was
appointed Chief Justice).  The device had been in use in the highest court in the Common-
wealth of Virginia for about a decade, but no other state or federal court employed it
before 1801.  The idea was derived from the practice of the Privy Council that had long
advised the King on the propriety of the decisions of the colonial judges that the parties
asked him to correct. See generally John P. Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law in the
Tudor and Stewart Periods: I, 48 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1950).
40 Official reporters of judicial decisions were in place in most American jurisdictions
in 1815, decades before such a function was known to England.  An official reporter was
not appointed in England until 1865. See CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING
207–08 (7th ed. 1964); JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 82–83 (1968); see also
J.H. Baker, Records, Reports and the Origins of Case-Law in England, in JUDICIAL RECORDS, LAW
REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH OF CASE LAW 15, 15–16 (John H. Baker ed., 1989).  French case
law was made regularly accessible by private reporters in the 1830s. See DAWSON, supra, at
402.  Regular annual reports commenced in Prussia in 1847. See id. at 438.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-3\CRN301.txt unknown Seq: 10  3-MAR-09 11:31
596 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:587
political division exists.41  This transformation of the Court was recog-
nized and decried by Jeffersonians as an illegitimate seizure of legisla-
tive powers.42
Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized the distinction between a
law court and a superlegislature in his most celebrated opinion in Mar-
bury v. Madison.43  He disclaimed the power to make law except as
required to decide those cases that he could not lawfully refuse to
decide.44  His opinion for the Court begged the public’s pardon for
making a bold political decision that the Justices were compelled to
make in order to correctly decide a case in which their jurisdiction
had been irresistibly invoked.45  That apology garnered in the profes-
sion and the public acceptance of the idea that even constitutional law
might be made by judges interpreting the preexisting text and adher-
ing to precedent when making decisions that they had an official duty
to decide.
Chief Justice Marshall’s proposition of inescapable judicial duty
had been seriously qualified by the time of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
remark depicting the Court as a crown jewel.46  Congressional legisla-
tion extending the authority of the Justices to deny review to many or
most of the cases appellants placed on their docket had transformed
41 See U.S. CONST. art. V; Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the Amendment Power to Disapprove
of Supreme Court Decisions: A Proposal for a “Republican Veto”, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 325
(1995) (“Thirty-four Senators, or 146 Representatives, or any combination of thirteen state
legislative chambers can defeat a ‘republican veto,’ [a type of amendment to disapprove a
Supreme Court decision] for good, bad, or no reason at all.”).
42 See JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED
194–96 (Richmond, Va., Shepherd & Pollard 1820) (advocating strict adherence to the
constitution and avoidance of “fluctuating precedents”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1816–1826, at
222, 223–25 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1899) (bemoaning
that the Court had begun to issue a single unanimous opinion, instead of allowing each
member of the Court to write his own opinion and provide his own reasons for that deci-
sion). But see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 15, 1823), in 3 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1816–1828, at 291 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1867).
43 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44 Id. at 176–78.  On Marshall’s exercise of self-restraint, see JEAN EDWARD SMITH,
JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 296–308 (1996) (arguing that “[i]f Marshall had
wanted to embarrass Jefferson, or if he had shared the partisan Federalist view,” he could
have used his power on the Court to do so, but he declined to venture into the political
fray).
45 See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 169–70 (“The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform du-
ties in which they have a discretion.”); see also id. at 144 (allowing Mr. Levi Lincoln, Attor-
ney General for President Jefferson, time to consider how to answer certain questions in
light of his duty to the Executive and to the Court, so as to avoid confrontation between
the political branches).
46 See Remarks on the Future of Federal Courts, supra note 23. R
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the institution.47  Indeed, by 1988,48 Congress had conferred such a
measure of freedom on Justices to choose the questions they decide
that no citizen has a right to present her case or argument to the
Court.  And the Court has largely forsaken the humble task of cor-
recting errors of lower courts other than those errors connected to
the issues that it chooses to consider, leaving that hard disciplinary
work to the courts of appeals.49  Thus, it no longer sits as a mere law
court with its specific duties defined by others but is indeed now a self-
defining superlegislature, or even a constitutional convention in black
robes.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, as the force of Chief
Justice Marshall’s proposition gained acceptance, and its political con-
sequences were recognized, state courts were established as political
institutions subject to the oversight of democratic legislatures.50  State
constitutions were revised to assure some form of rotation in high ju-
dicial offices, to provide other means of constraining judges of courts
of last resort or correcting bad law made by such judges, or both.51
Frederick Grimke´, a justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, expressed the
view increasingly shared in antebellum times and later associated with
Legal Realism52—that high court judges are making big political deci-
sions.53  Grimke´ concluded that “[i]f then the judges are appointed
for life, they may have the ability to act upon society, both inwardly
and outwardly, to a greater degree than the other departments.”54
47 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. R
48 Congress took the last step in extending the 1925 empowerment in 1988. See Act of
June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 1, 2(c), 5(a), 102 Stat. 662, 662–63 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
49 See Comm’n on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals, supra note
32, at 12 (finding that “the courts of appeals have become the only federal error-correcting R
courts” and the “federal appellate courts of last resort”).
50 For example, a Federalist legislature in New Hampshire in 1813 expelled two of the
three judges, for insufficient cause, from the state’s superior court of judicature when it
reconstructed the court as the supreme judicial court. EDWIN D. SANBORN, HISTORY OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE: FROM ITS FIRST DISCOVERY TO THE YEAR 1830, at 261–62 (Manchester,
N.H., John B. Clarke 1875).  The Democratic legislature elected in Kentucky in 1824 fired
all members of their highest court, all of whom were Whigs, and replaced them as punish-
ment for decisions that had an unwelcome impact on tenants and debtors. ARNDT M.
STICKLES, THE CRITICAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KENTUCKY, 1819–1829, at 43–64 (1929).
51 For a review of issues and literature in later times, see Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1998, at 79, 87–99.
52 For a recent account of legal realism, see Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as
Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1918 (2005) (defending the realist theory of
law to show that, although it can be criticized, it is also plausibly correct).
53 See FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 438 (John
William Ward ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1968) (1848) (“The judiciary does not deal so directly
nor so frequently with political questions as do the other departments.  But it does some-
times deal with them, and that too definitively . . . .”).
54 Id. at 438–39.
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And, he added, the legislative functions that judges perform “is a fact
entirely hidden from the great majority of the community.”55  It was
his reasoning that led most states to implement popular election of
judges for limited terms.56  And the reality of judicial lawmaking in
the twenty-first century is no longer hidden from the great majority.
For that reason, proposals to end the practice of electing judges have
little prospect of gaining the support of voters.
Although few of his contemporaries expressed disagreement with
Grimke´, Congress did nothing in his time to constrain the role of Jus-
tices sitting on the Supreme Court of the United States in the base-
ment of the Capitol.57  One reason was that the Supreme Court was an
organ of a weak national government, and the public therefore held it
in limited regard.58  As Keith Whittington recently observed:
In the nineteenth century, the task of the Court within the constitu-
tional regime was fairly straightforward.  The issues that came
before the Court were relatively few, and when the Court was asked
to say what the Constitution meant and recognized in its authority
to do so, the imperatives of the task were fairly clear.59
Other officials acted on their presumed authority to read the Consti-
tution for themselves.  Thus, when the Court proclaimed the rights of
the Cherokee to remain in Georgia,60 President Andrew Jackson sim-
ply disregarded its decision and allowed federal officers to send them
on “the Trail of Tears” to Oklahoma.61  When the Court unconstitu-
tionally declared itself to be the premier authority on the nation’s pri-
vate law governing contracts and property,62 the state supreme courts
55 Id. at 452.
56 See id. at 448, 448–62 (“An election for a term of years may be necessary to enable
the mind of the judge to keep pace with the general progress of knowledge and more
especially to make him acquainted with the diversified working of the institutions under
which he lives . . . .”); see also Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the
Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 217–19 (1993).
For accounts of elected judges, see Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery and Judicial
Professionalism: The Careers of Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861–1899, in THE NEW
HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST–CIVIL WAR AMERICA 29 passim (Gerard W. Gawalt ed.,
1984); Kermit L. Hall, The “Route to Hell” Retraced: The Impact of Popular Election on the South-
ern Appellate Judiciary, 1832–1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH
229 passim (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984).
57 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 284
(2007).
58 See id. at 230.
59 Id. at  284.
60 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560–63 (1832); JILL NORGREN, THE
CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND POLITICS 117–22 (1996).
61 For an account, see Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Geor-
gia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. HIST. 519 (1973).
62 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 8–9 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie held in part that by applying the doctrine from Swift
“this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by
the Constitution to the several states.”  304 U.S. at 80.
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disregarded it.  When a minor war arose between political factions in
Rhode Island, the Court timidly disowned the constitutional authority
to decide which was the legitimate government of the state, notwith-
standing the Federal Constitution’s explicit “guarantee[ ] to each
[state] a republican form of government.”63
The Court took a more aggressive step in 1857 when it declared
that Americans of African ancestry had no rights.64  The nation, led by
President Lincoln, fought a war in part to overrule the Dred Scott deci-
sion.  When President Lincoln and Congress were concerned that the
Court might impede the war effort, they appointed a tenth justice to
ensure that the Court would not be able to marshal the votes to do
so.65  When the Chief Justice issued a writ of habeas corpus to free a
citizen who was organizing resistance to the military draft, Lincoln or-
dered the Army to defy the writ.66  When it later seemed that the
Court might invalidate Reconstruction legislation, Congress fore-
closed its jurisdiction.67  And when the Court later invalidated the fed-
eral income tax,68 a constitutional amendment reversed its decision.69
Almost no contested policy of substantial national concern that the
Court announced in the nineteenth century was effectively
maintained.
To the extent that the Court successfully exercised significant po-
litical power in the nineteenth century, its authority generally resulted
from applying the Federal Constitution to constrain allegedly miscre-
ant state legislatures.  Thomas Cooley’s great nineteenth-century text
on American constitutional law was largely an account and synthesis of
the law of the states and not that of the nation.70  He singled out, as
inappropriate judicial overreaching, the decision of the Marshall
Court denying New Hampshire the power to restructure a corporate
63 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 32 (1849).
64 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396–97 (1857).  President Buchanan and
leading Senators encouraged the Scott decision.  On its subsequent history, see 3 MARTIN
SIEGEL, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE TANEY COURT, 1836–1864, at 66–68
(1987); see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERI-
CAN LAW AND POLITICS 307–14 (1978).
65 On Lincoln’s appointment of Stephen Field, see PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN
FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 95–97 (1997).
66 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 134 (1866).  The President’s action was
ratified by Congress. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.  His message is recorded
in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1908, at 19
(James D. Richardson ed., Wash., D.C., Bureau of Nat’l Literature & Art 1908).
67 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515, 518 (1868).
68 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 601 (1895), vacated 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
69 See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 225–29 (1993).
70 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Walter Carrington
ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 8th ed. 1927) (1868).
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entity, Dartmouth College, as a violation of the provision of the Fed-
eral Constitution forbidding states to “impair[ ] the obligation of the
charter.”71
James Bradley Thayer, the most thoughtful constitutional scholar
of the time, cautioned the Court against an apparently growing ten-
dency to invoke the Constitution to invalidate state legislation that it
disapproved.  He also stressed the importance of deference to the po-
litical judgment of elected representatives.  Thayer emphasized that
constitutional interpretation is primarily a task for legislators, not
judges.72  Another leading constitutional scholar of the late nine-
teenth century, Christopher Tiedemann, reassured the nation that it
need not worry about the modest authority of the Court:
Congress [has] the power to increase the number of the Supreme
Court judges, and thus, with the aid of the President, to change the
composition and tendencies of the Court.  If at any time the Su-
preme Court should too persistently withstand any popular demand
in a case in which the people will not submit to the judicial negative,
by an increase in the number of the judges . . . the popular will may
be realized.73
The first congressional enactments74 substantially enlarging the
Court’s discretionary power over its docket were each a reasonable
response to the overload on the docket of a still modest Supreme
Court then sitting in the basement of the Capitol.  The reforms were
not presented as changes in the political role of the Court, nor were
those secondary consequences foreseen.  The most important reform,
the 1925 statute known as the “Judges’ Bill,”75 was the handiwork of
Chief Justice Taft, who had returned to judicial office after an unsatis-
fying experience as President.76
71 Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 596–601 (1819).
Cooley’s criticism of this case appears in his treatise, 1 COOLEY, supra note 70, at 554–601. R
72 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 135 (1893); see James B. Thayer, Professor Thayer’s Address, in JOHN MAR-
SHALL: THE TRIBUTE OF MASSACHUSETTS 25, 68 (Marquis F. Dickinson ed., 1901).
73 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
162 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1890).
74 See supra note 17. R
75 So termed because judges lobbied for it. See Richard G. Stevens, Introduction to
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 17, at ix, ix; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, R
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 7 (6th ed. 2002).
76 Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2006). After losing the presidency in 1912, he
moved to Yale and wrote about constitutional law, chiefly about how constitutional law
serves to constrain his successors in the White House. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF
MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS passim (H. Jefferson Powell ed., Carolina Academic Press
2002) (1916).  On Taft’s leadership on the Court, see generally Robert Post, Judicial Man-
agement and Judicial Disinterest: The Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft
1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 50 (1998); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice:
Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267,
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As Chief Justice, Taft also authored the Judiciary Act of 1922, cre-
ating the Judicial Conference of the United States77 that would play a
growing role in the governance of the federal judiciary.  He also se-
cured construction of the Greek temple in which the Supreme Court
sits.78  These developments reflected a view that Taft had expressed
while campaigning for the presidency.  “I love judges and I love
courts,” he told the voters.  “They are my ideals, that typify on earth
what we shall meet hereafter in heaven under a just God.”79  Justices
sitting in their Taftian temple do indeed maintain a heavenly aura
about their work.  As Judge Posner cautioned: “Cocooned in their
marble palace, attended by sycophantic staff, and treated with ex-
treme deference wherever they go, Supreme Court Justices are at risk
of acquiring exaggerated opinions of their ability and character.”80
The Taft era was followed by a series of political triumphs for the
Court that encouraged Justices to exercise more fully their power as
the superlegislature.  First, while many viewed the Court-packing
events of 1936–37 as a capitulation by Justice Owen Roberts “to save
nine,” the organized bar and others saw the later response of Con-
gress in refusing to enlarge the Court as a triumph for the cause of
judicial independence.81  Then, in 1952, the Court prevailed over the
President in the Youngstown Steel Seizure case,82 notwithstanding con-
cerns that its decree invalidating an executive order would, and per-
haps did, impede the effort to provide arms for troops in combat in
Korea.  That event may have helped build the Court’s self-confidence
that belatedly enabled it to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the
1271–74 (2001); Kenneth W. Starr, William Howard Taft: The Chief Justice as Judicial Architect,
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 963, 965–68 (1992).  On the formation of the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence under Taft, see generally PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION 40–90 (1973) (discussing the development of major regional and national
institutions of federal judicial administration).
77 One of Taft’s first acts as Chief Justice was to abandon the practice of abstaining
from any effort to influence legislation in Congress, a practice established by John Marshall
and followed by all of Taft’s predecessors.  Taft lobbied and soon secured enactment of the
Judiciary Act of 1922, ch. 305, 42 Stat. 837.
78 Justice Brandeis protested that it made his colleagues into the “nine black beetles
in the temple of Karnak” and would cause them to have an inflated vision of themselves.
Pnina Lahav, History in Journalism and Journalism in History: Anthony Lewis and the Watergate
Crisis, 29 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 163, 163 (2004) (quoting Anthony Lewis, Echoes of History Heard
in a Pillared Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1974, § 1, at 26).
79 Jeffrey B. Morris, What Heaven Must Be Like: William Howard Taft as Chief Justice,
1921–30, in YEARBOOK 1983: SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 80, 80 (William F. Swin-
dler ed., 1983).  While President, Taft published an article on judicial administration. See
William H. Taft, The Delays of the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 28 (1908).
80 Posner, supra note 18, at 77. R
81 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT passim (1995); see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION passim (1998).
82 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Fourteenth Amendment: in 1954 it ordered public schools to be de-
segregated, albeit only “with all deliberate speed.”83
That cautious decision led to the confrontation in Little Rock in
1956 when President Eisenhower sent the 101st Airborne Division to
secure the place of nine African-American students in Central High
School.84  Although the decisions of both the Court and the President
were praiseworthy, the response of the Court in proclaiming its au-
thority in Cooper v. Aaron85 was breathtaking.  In a papal manner, the
Court declared that mere state officials were not entitled to read the
Constitution for themselves to justify their protests, but were bound to
accept whatever meaning the Justices might give to the constitutional
text, and that a failure of state officials to do so would violate their
oaths of office.86  The Court thus implied that state officials should be
impeached and removed from office merely for their public disagree-
ment with the Court.  The general language of the opinion applied
equally to the President, members of Congress, and other federal gov-
ernment officials, whom the Court cautioned against reading the Con-
stitution for themselves.  Contrary to the Court’s implication, this was
a fairly novel idea at the time.87  Philip Kurland plausibly asked,88 if an
opinion of the Court is so immutable, how could the Court defy its
own dictum in Plessy v. Ferguson?89
Desegregation inspired a generation of young lawyers to think of
constitutional law as a great instrument for social reform, better even
than Congress or any other legislative body bound to respect the opin-
ions of an electorate.90  That the Court and the lower federal judiciary
played an important role in the two decades of civil rights struggles
cannot be doubted and should not be disparaged.91  But many others
played important roles in the cause, most notably Martin Luther King,
Jr. and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference who success-
83 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
84 See TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 108
(1984).
85 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see generally FREYER, supra note 84. R
86 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; see also id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
87 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 57, at 285. R
88 Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19, 31 (1969).
Other government officials generally accept the Court’s interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, however debatable those interpretations may be. See Daniel A. Farber, The Importance
of Being Final, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 364 (2003); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1997)
(arguing that Cooper reflects the reason for the Constitution as law—it allows one interpre-
tation to become authoritative).
89 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
90 Laura Kalman refers to a generation of lawyers as “the children of the Warren
Court.” LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 52 (1996).
91 See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s de-
segregation jurisprudence).
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fully altered the moral judgment of many fellow citizens.92  Congress
also played a decisive role in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964,93
and the Department of Justice brought force to bear where it was
needed.94  The Courts’ legal opinions had changed few minds, but
segregation could not, in the end, stand up to Congress and the Exec-
utive Branch.95
By 1961, the Court, with self-confidence enlarged by the conse-
quences of the several judiciary acts, its semi-divine surroundings, its
access to an airborne division to enforce its decisions, and its then-
recent history in achieving social change, was prepared to take on nu-
merous other assignments.  Under the intellectual and political lead-
ership of Justice William Brennan,96 the Court took on the job of
making America more humane by proclaiming new constitutional
rights that would “shap[e] a way of life for the American people.”97
To justify this aim, Justice Brennan explained that “[t]he choice of
issues for decision largely determines the image that the American
people have of their Supreme Court.”98
92 See generally DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986) (detailing Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s development as the foremost spokesperson of the civil rights movement).  Indeed, the
Black Power Movement’s threats of violence against racists and racist institutions may also
have played a role in changing the public mind. See TIMOTHY B. TYSON, BLOOD DONE SIGN
MY NAME 197–219 (2004).
93 Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000 (2006)).
94 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 363 (2004) (arguing that the intervention of the De-
partment of Justice and Congress achieved desegregation that the federal judiciary alone
was powerless to accomplish).
95 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008) (“The numbers show that the Supreme Court contributed virtu-
ally nothing to ending segregation of the public schools in the Southern states in the dec-
ade following Brown.  The entrance of Congress and the executive branch . . . changed
this. . . .  In the first year of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964], nearly as much desegregation
was achieved as during all the preceding years of Supreme Court action.”); see also Melvin I.
Urofsky, “Among the Most Humane Moments in All Our History”: Brown v. Board of Education
in Historical Perspective, in BLACK, WHITE AND BROWN: THE LANDMARK SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION CASE IN RETROSPECT 1, 34–38 (Clare Cushman & Melvin I. Urofsky eds., 2004) (dis-
cussing southern states’ opposition to the Court’s decision in Brown and their attempts to
thwart desegregation).
96 See generally KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA (1993) (outlining Justice Brennan’s career and the
extent of his influence on Supreme Court’s direction and ideology); FRANK I. MICHELMAN,
BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999) (discussing Justice Brennan’s ideas on constitutional de-
mocracy and democratic liberalism).
97 DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 161–62 (1997).  For contemporaneous criticism of
this change, see Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975).
98 William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 473, 483 (1973).  In defense of this expanded view of his role, Justice Brennan
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The Justices did not find some of those rights in the explicit text
of the Constitution but discerned and elaborated upon them in their
opinions for the Court.99  Sanford Levinson has aptly observed that
during this time many lawyers and legal scholars increasingly thought
of the constitutional text in the way that the Catholic Church has tra-
ditionally thought of scripture: as a text truly understood only by
those high clergymen professionally invested in its interpretation.100
Prior to the 1960s the Justices had not presented themselves as
Cardinals of a secular faith.101  Since that time, the Court’s conduct
has solidly reflected the conviction, increasingly widespread among
lawyers as well as academic theorists, that they are a primary framer of
what the law ought to be, and not merely a reporter of what it is.102
The Court thus became, it has been said, a mobilizer of an elite
group103 and a primary source of major political change, and thus
“the crown jewel” of American law.  Perhaps it was but coincidental
that the entire legal profession gained status from its identification
with the jewel.104
adopted Justice Goldberg’s statement that the “power to decide cases presupposes the
power to determine what cases will be decided.” Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).  In re-
sponses to Paul Freund’s questioning of this principle’s origin, Professor Hartnett confirms
that it was an idea first advanced in 1925 as a result of the Judges’ Bill, which gave the
Court the power to control its own docket.  Hartnett, supra note 17, at 1736. R
99 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The[ ] right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without inter-
vention of the government.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of pri-
vacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269–82 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (discussing whether the application of death penalty would violate Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment”).
100 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 46–50 (1988).  This form of judicial
supremacy was also expressed by Lord Coke; he explained it to King James as a subject
accessible only to initiates and quite beyond the understanding of a mere royal. CATHE-
RINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE
(1552–1634), at 304–06 (1957). Chief Justice Taft expressed the thought as follows:
“[T]he people at the polls no more than kings upon the throne are fit to pass upon ques-
tions involving the judicial interpretation of the law.” GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND:
THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 213 (1994) (footnote omitted).
101 That its intellectual leader, Justice Brennan, celebrated the Catholic faith may have
been more significant than was recognized at the time.
102 This vision was not so new.  As noted above, concern over judicial activism had
motivated many amendments of state constitutions in the nineteenth century. See supra
notes 50–52 and accompanying text.  Duncan Kennedy attributes this vision to other devel- R
opments in western thought.  Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1065 (2004).
103 Alexander Bickel was among the first to recognize that this is the role the Court has
assigned itself.  Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41–42 (1961).
104 See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, UNRESTRAINED: JUDICIAL EXCESS AND THE MIND OF THE
AMERICAN LAWYER (2008).
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In 2005, Justice Breyer made a valiant and honorable effort to
explain the Court’s political role as responsive to what he denotes as a
democratic tradition of “active liberty.”105  He sees himself as a mem-
ber of a small elite commissioned by the people to interpret the Con-
stitution as a guide to the best practical solutions for the problems of
the day.106  He does not acknowledge, and perhaps does not recog-
nize, that his assessments of problems and their solutions necessarily
reflect unarticulated value choices that many citizens may and do vig-
orously dispute.107  To be sure, Justice Breyer does advocate a measure
of modesty in the exercise of judicial power that distinguishes him
from Justice Brennan,108 but the values he brings to the task are simi-
lar to those of Justice Brennan, and they may be disputed and rejected
by many citizens.
This expansion of the Court’s political responsibility obviously en-
croaches upon the responsibility of elected officials but is not necessa-
rily an offense to these elected officials.  Clearly, many elected
politicians welcome the opportunity to leave the duty of making un-
welcome decisions to “life-tenured” judges.109  The politicians are free
to denounce such decisions without bearing accountability to voters
or campaign contributors.110
The power to decide what to decide was a major factor in the
transformation of the Court in the last century as the Justices became
noticeably less constrained in making political decisions.  But the
Court can no longer invoke John Marshall’s justification that it is per-
105 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
3–12 (2005).  A more recent depiction of the modest role of the Justices is DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2009).
106 See id. at 18 (“Since law is connected to life, judges, in applying [the Constitution]
in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including ‘contemporary conditions,
social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.’”).
107 For an extended critique, see Ken I. Kersch, Justice Breyer’s Mandarin Liberty, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 759 (2006) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 105). R
108 See BREYER, supra note 105, at 18–19.  In this respect, Justice Breyer sides with CASS R
R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at xiv
(1999) (arguing that judicial minimalism promotes, rather than undermines, democratic
processes).  Jeffrey Rosen describes Justice Breyer as “cautious, incremental, pragmatic,
respectful of historical arguments, and suspicious of sweeping claims about fundamental
values.”  Jeffrey Rosen, Two Cheers for the Rehnquist Court, 1 NEXUS 37, 39 (1996).
109 See Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1352
(2006) (“[T]oday’s lawmakers do not place a high value on their power to independently
interpret the Constitution. . . .  Over the past thirty years, the percent of hearings raising
significant constitutional issues has declined throughout Congress.”).
110 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 57, at 282 (“Rather than bearing the political cost of R
casting votes against popular positions for the sake of abstract constitutional principles,
elected officials on both sides of the political aisle are willing to accept judicial supremacy.”
(footnote omitted)).
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forming an unavoidable duty.111  The Court generally exercises its
power to choose cases without any of the amenities of a judicial pro-
cess, that is “without collegial deliberation, well-defined rules, prece-
dential constraint, or public accountability.”112  It is widely observed
that the process of case selection is “hopelessly indeterminate and
unilluminating.”113  This unrestrained power is exercised largely in
the privacy of chambers; ideological and strategic considerations
abound.114  For all these reasons, the process bears scant resemblance
to the traditional judicial task of actually deciding cases on their
merits.
The question of whether the social and political reforms imposed
by the judicial superlegislature have been as beneficial as once hoped
is often raised when secondary consequences are considered.115
Whether the diverse political judgments that the Court imposed on
the states were benign has been warmly debated;116 all of us would
agree with some of the policies that the Court favors and disagree with
others.117  Justice John Harlan was among those striving to diminish
111 See Hartnett, supra note 17, at 1717 (“A court that can simply refuse to hear a case R
can no longer credibly say that it had to decide it.”).
112 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Juris-
prudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 452 (2004).
113 Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Re-
sponsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 790 (1984); see also Editorial, The
Supreme Court and Certiorari: What Determines the Agenda?, 84 JUDICATURE 112, 112 (2000).
114 See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 112 at 410–15 (reviewing research finding that R
judges choose to grant certiorari based on ideological or strategic reasons).  The data
tends to confirm that Justices are often looking for a case that would be a “good vehicle”
for developing the political policy they favor. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 265 (1991).
115 See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 94 at 454–68 (arguing that the Court’s decision in R
Brown spurred social reform but created enforceability problems and violent southern re-
actions); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2d ed. 2004); ROSENBERG, supra note 95, at R
420–29 (arguing that Supreme Court decisions often provide reformers symbolic victories
and the illusion of substantive change); Gerald N. Rosenberg, African-American Rights After
Brown, in BLACK, WHITE AND BROWN: THE LANDMARK SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASE IN RET-
ROSPECT, supra note 95, at 203, 231 (“[C]ourts may serve an ideological function of luring R
movements for social reform to an institution that is structurally constrained from serving
their needs, providing only an illusion of change.”); see also David J. Garrow, Bad Behavior
Makes Big Law: Southern Malfeasance and the Expansion of Federal Judicial Power, 1954–1968, 82
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2008).
116 For diverse ruminations, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION:
RACE, RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED 200–01 (1994) (positing that the Supreme
Court has lost its way and infringed on the role of the legislature); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1224–29 (1992); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1959)
(arguing that courts should respect value judgments made by legislatures).
117 Compare ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117–18 (1996) (arguing that the way to achieve constitutional legit-
imacy is through a constitutional amendment “making any federal or state court decisions
subject to being overruled by a majority vote of each House of Congress”), with LARRY D.
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his colleagues’ ambitions, and he cautioned: “The Constitution is not
a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this
Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven
for reform movements.”118
Reforms imposed on the public from above have special
problems; they are less likely to command acceptance and more likely
to evoke resistance.  Few citizens confident of their rights are likely to
get their moral or political values from the utterances of a superlegis-
lature.  One certainty is that the Court’s extension of the Fourteenth
Amendment has substantially diminished American citizens’ sense
that a representative process, for which they share some measure of
responsibility, accounts for important and contestable government
policies.119  Superlegislation is also less likely to be the result of com-
promise, which is the saving grace of democratic government.  When
political mistakes are embedded in proclamations of federal constitu-
tional law, they are all but impossible to correct.  Indeed, when an
effort was made to secure ratification of a wise and badly needed
amendment declaring the equal rights of women, a prevailing argu-
ment against ratification was that the Court could not be trusted to
accept the obvious meaning of its text and would likely invoke it to
achieve novel cultural changes contrary to the wishes of most
citizens.120
Jefferson Powell cautions the Justices on the morality of imposing
their political preferences on other citizens.  “[A]t the heart of a faith-
ful justice’s conscience, shaping his or her view of what the Court
should decide, are constitutional virtues of humility and acquiescence
that counsel against judicial arrogance and overconfidence.”121  Alas,
as Professor Powell’s work implies, the Court often lacks those “consti-
tutional virtues.”  Robert Nagel has made a strong case for attributing
the frequent absence of such virtues to the failings of the American
legal profession.122  As he observes, many contemporary American
lawyers have difficulty visualizing the possibility that an important or
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
227–48 (2004) (advocating for a system of popular constitutionalism rather than the Su-
preme Court as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution), and MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154–76 (1999) (arguing for the abolishment of
judicial review in favor of popular constitutionalism).
118 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624–25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119 The degeneration of state sovereignty over matters of popular concern also seems
to have vitiated the political vitality of local governments. See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL,
THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001).
120 See William Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of Change,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 933, 957 n.61.
121 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JU-
DICIAL DECISION 118 (2008).
122 See NAGEL, supra note 104, at 121–33. R
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interesting political issue does not have a legal, constitutional dimen-
sion.123  Perhaps on that account, there is no exit from Roe v. Wade or
other divisive issues that elected politicians would as soon leave to
those with life tenure.  As Professor Nagel observes, Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s excuse that he was forced to decide the constitutional issue
presented in Marbury v. Madison, and that he was only deciding that
narrow issue, is a contagious idea upon which American lawyers were
raised and that serves to empower and elevate their profession.124
The one recourse visibly open to citizens offended by policies
made by Justices is to elect a President who might someday appoint
Justices who share their political preferences.  That hope has made
the judicial confirmation process a test of political ideology,125 even
for district and circuit judges.126  There is no need in this brief re-
minder to reconsider the merits of the many public policies that the
Court, once elevated by the mid-century events, was moved to find in
the subtexts of the Constitution or unnoticed congressional enact-
123 See id. at 130.
124 See id. at 129.
125 The inability of Harriet Miers to win confirmation in 2005 was apparently the result
of her inability to persuade Republican Senators that she was sufficiently committed to
their political convictions. See Michael A. Fletcher & Charles Babington, Miers, Under Fire
from Right, Withdrawn as Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1 (quoting former
Senator Dan Coats, who accompanied Miers on meetings where “senators rightly wanted to
see some objective evidence of what her judicial philosophy was”).  The Senate Minority
Leader, Harry Reid, at the time of her nomination by President Bush released a statement:
I like Harriet Miers.  As White House Counsel, she has worked with me
in a courteous and professional manner.  I am also impressed with the fact
that she was a trailblazer for women as managing partner of a major Dallas
law firm and as the first woman president of the Texas Bar Association.
In my view, the Supreme Court would benefit from the addition of a
justice who has real experience as a practicing lawyer.  The current justices
have all been chosen from the lower federal courts.  A nominee with rele-
vant non-judicial experience would bring a different and useful perspective
to the Court.
Press Release, Senator Harry Reid, U.S. Senate, Statement of Senator Harry Reid on the
Nomination of Harriet Miers to the U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 3, 2005), http://democrats.
senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=246777.
After the confirmation of Justice Samuel Alito, nominated by President Bush after
Miers’ withdrawal, Senator Reid released another statement:
I continue to believe that Harriet Miers received a raw deal.  She is an ac-
complished lawyer, a trailblazer for women and a strong advocate of legal
services for the poor.  Not only was she denied the up-down vote that my
Republican colleagues say every nominee deserves, but she was never even
afforded the chance to make her case to the Judiciary Committee.
Press Release, Senator Harry Reid, U.S. Senate, Reid Statement on the Confirmation of
Samuel Alito (Jan. 31, 2006), http://democrats.senate.gov./newsroom/record.cfm?id=
250959.
126 For an account, see GEYH, supra note 5, at 171–222 (discussing prospective account- R
ability of judicial nominees to the U.S. Senate); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITI-
CIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 151–80 (2005)
(observing that since the 1968 Presidential election, candidates have made the selection of
Justices and judges a campaign issue).
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ments.  Few informed readers will question Judge Posner’s observa-
tion that “[j]udicial modesty is not the order of the day in the
Supreme Court.”127
II
THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE CAUSED BY
SUPERLAW GOVERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
We note one set of law “reforms” imposed by the Court through
its generous reading of the Fourteenth Amendment as examples of its
excessive independence.  The constitutional law made by the Court in
recent decades has gravely imperiled the independence of many state
judiciaries.128  Indeed, the Court has by its edicts made it virtually im-
possible for many states to ensure the appropriate independence of
their judiciaries.129
First, the Court’s holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment protec-
tion of free speech has been extended to detrimentally affect the inde-
127 Posner, supra note 18, at 56; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 R
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (protesting that “[t]his Court seems incapable of admitting
that some matters—any matters—are none of its business”) (citations omitted).  But note
that Justice Scalia was among those who could not admit that the outcome of a presidential
election is none of the Court’s business.  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046–47 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (responding to Justice Stevens’ dissent to the Court’s intervention
by granting certiorari).
128 Judicial elections are a special problem, but the negative consequence of the
Court’s derivation of the “one man, one vote” rule from the Equal Protection Clause
should not be ignored.  That decision has increased the manipulation of district bounda-
ries by legislators diminishing the vulnerability of elected bodies to popular influence.  In
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–71 (1964), the Court held that a state constitution pro-
viding that an upper house in the legislature seating representatives from each county did
not meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On the current state of the issue, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 601 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s regulation of political
gerrymandering can be justified); Heather K. Gerken, The Texas and Pennsylvania Partisan
Gerrymandering Cases: Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal
Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004) (discussing the Court’s current and prior juris-
prudence and speculating on what the Court’s next steps will be); Samuel Issacharoff &
Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 541 (2004) (arguing that it is impossible to render claims of political gerrymander-
ing nonjusticiable and that the Justices’ intervention, prompted by claims of excessive par-
tisanship, may actually encourage further reduction in political competition); Daniel R.
Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 475–501 (2004) (discussing application of the
“got theory” argument, which is that the Court must defer to the political branches in these
political cases, including partisan gerrymandering cases).  So far, “one man, one vote” has
not arisen in cases involving judicial elections.
129 See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (2003) (examining the Court’s role in
regulating political equality); Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote,
102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003) (discussing the one person, one vote standard in a general
context rather than specifically applied to judicial elections); cf. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging
the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (2005) (reviewing HASEN, supra).
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pendence of many state judiciaries.  Justice Brandeis, a judge often
celebrated for his self-restraint, led the first step in this development.
His step was consequential only in constraining brutalities in the ad-
ministration of criminal law.130  He took this step only weeks after
Congress had empowered the Court to refuse to hear appeals from
the highest state courts,131 and perhaps he would not have taken it if
the Justices were obliged to review all the claims to procedural rights
advanced by defendants convicted in state courts.
The Court then went on to impose many other constraints on
state laws that no one had previously detected in the Fourteenth
Amendment.132  It found, for example, that not only Congress but
also state legislatures must follow the First Amendment and shall
make no “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press.”133  All state constitutions already contained similar lan-
guage.  The effects of the Court’s rendition were to transfer the pri-
mary responsibility for enforcing related civil liberties from state
courts to federal courts and to transfer the primary responsibility for
declaring the scope of our civil liberties from state supreme courts to
itself.
Readers will surely join the authors in affirming that many of the
Court’s civil liberties’ proclamations were welcome or at least benign.
The specific problem to which we point is that the Court has enlarged
civil liberties in ways that have had unfortunate and seemingly irreme-
diable consequences for both federal and state laws governing the
conduct of democratic elections.  The impact upon the elections of
judges, which state constitutions require in order to provide a mea-
sure of democratic accountability for their politicized judiciaries, has
been especially consequential.
Perhaps the Court’s most extravagant proclamation of public pol-
icy is its declaration that citizens have a constitutional right to spend
money to influence election outcomes, even judicial elections,
through campaign contributions to candidates or through indepen-
130 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
131 See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 937–38.
132 Justice Stone’s famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938), declared that the purpose of the Court was to advance the interests of
citizens less influential with legislatures. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MOD-
ERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, in 12 THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 39, at 116–42 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2006) (stating that footnote four from Carolene R
Products announced “the paradigm of post-1937 constitutional development”).
133 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In Gitlow, the Court commenced the process of incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.  268 U.S. at 664–67.  For an
account, see ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007).
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dent use of the media.  In the United States today, “money is
speech.”134  The Court has been seemingly oblivious to the resem-
blance of campaign contributions to bribery, a matter of grave sensi-
tivity to elected officers at every level of government.  In regard to the
federal government, a visible consequence of money as speech is the
necessity felt by Congresspersons and the President to reward contrib-
utors with “earmark” appropriations or the like—expenditures that
would not have been made except in response to indispensable cam-
paign support.  The financial dependency requires legislators and
presidents to pay close heed to the advice of lobbyists who represent
the sources of funds required for retention of office.  But Article III
judges who hold office for “good behavior” are not obliged to raise
money to keep their jobs, so they can view the idea that money is
speech without personal anxiety.  If it is true that Washington is “bro-
ken,” so are most or all state capitals, and much of the responsibility
for the breakage must be assigned to those sheltered in the temple.
For state judicial elections, the resemblance of a judicial cam-
paign contribution to a bribe is a special horror.135  Contributions to
state judicial campaigns go to judges whom the donors expect or hope
will make agreeable decisions, but these contributions do not obligate
the judge to depart from preexisting law.  Defeated litigants in state
courts, however, are likely to be skeptical.  One recent example in-
volved a justice elected in 2005 to the Supreme Court of Illinois in a
monstrously expensive campaign.  Shortly thereafter, he cast the de-
ciding vote to reverse a very large award of damages rendered by a
lower court against an insurance company whose officers had made
134 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 262 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Buckley, which struck down provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 that limited campaign expenditures, is the premier decision in this area. See gener-
ally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55–153 (2004) (discussing the design of demo-
cratic institutions, the nature of equal political representation, the role of political parties,
and the structure of election financing); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 383–97 (2009) (discussing Buckley and subsequent cases dealing with
the danger of corruption resulting from political campaign contributions).  The Supreme
Court revisited the issue in McConnell v. FEC, in which the Court reviewed provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.  540 U.S. 93 (2003); cf. also Randall v. Sorell, 548
U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (holding that limitations on expenditures by candidates and con-
tributions by political parties in a Vermont campaign finance statute were “inconsistent
with the First Amendment”).  But cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382
(2000) (applying Buckley but sustaining a Missouri law limiting the size of contributions to
candidates in state senate races to $1,075). The Court’s latest utterance pushes the limit a
little further by invalidating a federal law allowing candidates to accept larger individual
contributions if they are competing with a “millionaire candidate” spending vast sums of
his own money.  Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770–75 (2008) (invalidating parts of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
135 See generally Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’
Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 96–133 (1985) (discussing
judicial campaign financing and possible reforms).
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major contributions to his campaign.136  When asked to review that
final judgment by the Illinois court as a denial of due process, the
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States chose not to be-
come involved.137  The Supreme Court agreed to consider a similar
case from West Virginia,138 only to have the challenged judge belat-
edly recuse himself.139
The freedom to use money to influence the selection of judges is
further called into question by the Court’s affirmation of the right of
judicial candidates to make campaign promises.  For decades, bar or-
ganizations have maintained standards of judicial ethics constraining
the conduct of candidates for judicial office.140  In 2002, the Supreme
Court cast a large cloud of doubt over all such rules of judicial eth-
ics.141  The Court invalidated a Minnesota rule, in force since 1975,
that provided that a “candidate for a judicial office, including an in-
cumbent judge,” shall not “announce his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues.”142  The Eighth Circuit further elaborated on
remand, when it additionally struck down rules foreclosing partisan-
136 After accepting over $350,000 from diverse employees of State Farm Insurance
Company for his 2004 campaign, Justice Lloyd Karmeier denied a motion to disqualify
himself from casting the deciding vote in favor of State Farm on its appeal from an adverse
judgment requiring it to pay punitive damages.  Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
835 N.E.2d 801, 863–64 (2005) (reversing part of the lower court’s judgment, including
punitive damages), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2006); see Leonard Post, Contributions
to Justice Lead to Protest: Ethics Case Highlights Judicial Election Issue, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 13, 2006,
at 4.
137 Avery, 547 U.S. at 1003.
138 Justice Recusing Self from Massey Appeals, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Charleston, W.
Va.), Feb. 3, 2009, at 2A, LexisNexis Academic.
139 Marcia Coyle, Review Sought on Judicial Recusals: W.Va. Case Triggers Key Ethical Query,
NAT’ L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, at 1.
140 The American Bar Association first promulgated its Canons of Judicial Ethics in
1924. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924), in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS ON PROFESSION
ETHICS AND CANON JUDICIAL ETHICS 29, 29–39 (1936).  In 1972 the ABA published its
Model Code of Judicial Conduct that was intended to be enforced by a disciplinary system.
An important aim of the Code was to protect the independence of the elected judiciary by
forbidding those campaign practices most likely to call the integrity and disinterest of the
candidates into public question.  Judges have been subjected to discipline for gross viola-
tions of such rules. See, e.g., William Glaberson, States Rein in Truth-Bending in Court Races:
Judges Face Penalties for Deceiving Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at A1 (“Across the coun-
try, judges are being fined, censured, and even threatened with removal for practicing that
venerable political art: exaggerating or outright lying during a campaign.”).  In 2007, the
Code was revised.  Although states have enacted diverse variations on the code, all have
enforcement procedures that are active. See generally JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT AND ETHICS § 11.03 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing judicial discipline agency jurisdiction
over campaign ethics violations).
141 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (striking down a
rule prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed
legal and political issues on First Amendment grounds).
142 MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).
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ship of judicial candidates143 and forbidding direct requests for cam-
paign funds by judicial candidates.144  The Supreme Court held that
Minnesota’s law of judicial campaign ethics violated the First Amend-
ment as incorporated in the Fourteenth.145  Justice O’Connor ex-
plained in her concurring opinion that if the people of Minnesota
choose to elect their judges, they must choose as well to respect the
newly proclaimed First Amendment rights of candidates.  It seems that
voters must reconsider the reform and do it Justice O’Connor’s way or
not at all.  It also seems that concerned voters are unlikely to be per-
suaded by mere dicta to surrender their authority over their courts.
Yet another major problem regarding the content of utterances
presented in the course of campaigning is defamation.  The Supreme
Court has affirmed the freedom of citizens to defame public
figures.146  Judges, as public figures, are exposed to vicious and mis-
leading attacks during judicial campaigning that almost surely impair
public regard for the courts.147  In some circumstances, they may be
more exposed to defamation because so few genuine, current political
issues of interest to voters are present in judicial campaign contests.148
The Court has even affirmed the right to make defamatory utterances
anonymously.149
An extreme example of political defamation arose in the judicial
election held in Wisconsin in 2008.150  Justice Louis Butler, an Afri-
143 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 754–63 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
144 Id. at 763–66.
145 See id. at 766 (holding that the state rule violated the First Amendment).
146 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964) (holding that in order for
public officials to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to their official
conduct, they must prove “actual malice”).
147 See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done amid Efforts
to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308,
313–15 (1997) (discussing the removal of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White);
Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Justices
Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68 (1999) (discussing the defeat in retention elections
of Nebraska Supreme Court Justice David Lanphier and Tennessee Supreme Court Justice
Penny White); Emily Heller, A Pa. Rarity: Incumbent Justice Out: Anger over Quiet Pay Raise
Hits Judicial Vote, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2005, at 6; Carol Morello, W.Va. Supreme Court Justice
Defeated in Rancorous Contest, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A15.
148 For an empirical study of voter awareness of the identities of judicial candidates,
see J. Christopher Heagarty, Public Opinion and an Elected Judiciary: New Avenues for Reform,
39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1287, 1295–99 (2003).
149 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking down
an Ohio provision prohibiting anonymous campaign materials on First Amendment
grounds).
150 See Viveca Novak, Judgment Day in Wisconsin, FACTCHECK.ORG, Mar. 10, 2008, http://
www.factcheck.org/judicial-campaigns/judgment_day_in_wisconsin.html [hereinafter No-
vak, Judgment Day]; see also Viveca Novak, Wisconsin Judgment Day: the Sequel, FACTCHECK.ORG,
Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/wisconsin_judgment_day_the_se-
quel.html [hereinafter Novak, Sequel].
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can-American judge, was a candidate for reelection.151  His opponent,
Michael Gableman, a trial judge with brief experience and questiona-
ble qualifications for the office, spent many dollars on defamatory tel-
evision advertising.152  A major feature of his campaign was an ad
showing Justice Butler’s image sharing the screen with that of a for-
mer client who was also African American and who was a convicted
rapist.153  The voice-over reported that Justice Butler had protected
this rapist.154  It was true that Butler, many years earlier while serving
as a public defender, had represented this client.155  The client had
been convicted of rape, served nine years in state prison, and then, on
his release, committed the offense again.156  Not only was this cam-
paign commercial perhaps the most blatant display of “the race card”
in modern memory, but it was also a fraud.157  But it won.158  Perhaps
this disgraceful campaign is not constitutionally protected.  But if the
Wisconsin legal profession is permitted to impose an appropriate
sanction on Justice Gableman,159 the imposition of a sanction will re-
quire reducing the reach of constitutional law that the Supreme Court
has proclaimed.
To avoid the obvious problems associated with judicial cam-
paigns, whether partisan or non-partisan, many states adopted varia-
tions of the “Missouri Plan” that was fashioned by Progressives in the
early years of the twentieth century.160  The Plan reinforces judicial
independence by replacing competitive elections with retention elec-
tions.161  The voters have an opportunity to remove a notably unpopu-
lar judge from office but do not choose the replacement, who is
selected by the usual appointment process.  The absence of an oppos-
ing candidate provided a measure of job security and independence
for the others.  For decades, and in many states, this system worked
well.  Judges were restrained by the knowledge that they were account-
151 See Novak, Judgment Day, supra note 150. R
152 See id.
153 See Novak, Sequel, supra note 150. R
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 The strategy may have been suggested by John Grisham’s novel The Appeal (2007), a
painful account of a bought judicial election.
158 See Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2008, § 1, at 1.
159 The Wisconsin Judicial Commission commenced a proceeding on October 7, 2008
in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. See Patrick Marley & Steven Walters, Judicial Commis-
sion Says Gableman Ad Was Deceiving, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2008, at A1, LexisNexis
Academic.
160 See Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary:
An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 847 (1994).
161 See id. at 847–48.
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able to the citizens they served.162  Meanwhile, every judge that sought
retention was retained and citizens who voted for retention acquired a
measured sense of responsibility for the integrity of their courts.163
But beginning in California in the 1980s, interest groups discovered
the possibility that the law being made in the highest state courts
might be made more agreeable to themselves if specific judges were
denied retention.164  Millions of dollars are now sometimes spent for
such purposes.165  And defamatory television commercials are, for ob-
vious reasons, the instrument of choice.  Constraints on such cam-
paigns of intimidation encounter obvious difficulty because of the
propositions that money is constitutionally protected speech and that
one is entitled to freely speak ill of public figures.
California Chief Justice Ronald George wrote the recent opinion
of his court allowing gay marriage.166  His opinion was apparently
overridden by voters who amended the state constitution in 2008.167
He must stand for retention in 2009 if he is to remain on the court.168
In 2008, he summoned a conference to discuss judicial indepen-
dence.169  What, indeed, can one say to California voters to assure
their fidelity to the principle of judicial independence in the light of
such decisions?  Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer acknowledged that
judicial election campaigns in his state have become “very negative”
but offered the hopeful thought that requiring publication of cam-
162 See id. at 849.
163 See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 102–06 (1992); Schoshinski, supra note 160, at 850.  For R
an account of the variations in judicial selection schemes, see Polly J. Price, Selection of State
Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 9, 16–19 (Roger
Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).
164 For accounts of the California debacle, see BETTY MEDSGER, FRAMED: THE NEW
RIGHT ATTACK ON CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE BIRD AND THE COURTS 80–81 (1983); PREBLE STOLZ,
JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
(1981); John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Judicial Reform in California, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN
THE STATES 139, 156 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993); Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing A Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1969 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability,
Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 809 (1986).
165 Data on lawyer contributions was provided by the American Bar Association. See
TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PART
TWO 89–107 (1998). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce reportedly spent $120 million in
2002–06, most of it through the Institute for Legal Reform, a tax-free affiliate. See Zach
Patton, Robe Warriors, GOVERNING, Mar. 2006, at 34, 36.
166 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 397 (Cal. 2008).
167 Jessica Garrison et al., Voters Approve Proposition 8 Banning Same-Sex Marriages, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-gaymarriage5-2008nov05,
0,1545381.story.
168 See MacLean, supra note 11. R
169 See id.
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paign contributions tended to diminish the odium of the television
commercials.170
Given the unrest of voters that Justices Breyer and O’Connor
have addressed, there is very little prospect of voters in many states
approving constitutional amendments to remove their judges from
their ballots.171  As J.J. Gass has forcefully affirmed, “due process
rights of individual litigants are not the state’s to forfeit.”172  Due pro-
cess ought therefore be taken to preclude the submission of a citizen’s
case to a judge elected at the expense of his adversary, as happened in
Illinois in 2005.173
Judicial elections are the most serious and seemingly insoluble
problem created by the Court’s jurisprudence on democratic elec-
tions.  But American political campaigns are generally deplorable, as
(now Judge) Michael McConnell concluded: “The landscape of Amer-
ican politics today is not an encouraging sight. . . .  It is fair to say that
the responsibility for a great deal of the political problem is to be laid
at the feet of the Supreme Court’s well-meaning reforms from the
early 1960s.”174
A fitting confirmation of the reality observed by Judge McConnell
unfolded in 2000 when a majority of the Court decided the presiden-
tial election, usurping the roles of the electoral college and the House
of Representatives—notwithstanding the text of the Constitution,
plainly written to exclude the Justices from any role in the selection of
the President who selects their future colleagues.175  Surprisingly, the
170 See id.
171 The most recent effort to amend a state constitution to make judges less accounta-
ble to the people was made in Ohio in 1987.  Despite the support of both parties and an
array of other organizations, it was soundly rejected by the voters. See John D. Felice et al.,
Judicial Reform in Ohio, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES, supra note 164, at 51, 51–69.  A R
similar result can now be expected in other states.  The American Bar Association in 2002
reluctantly recognized this reality by acknowledging public finance of judicial campaigns as
an alternative acceptable to it. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAM-
PAIGNS passim (2002).
172 J.J. GASS, AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 10
(2004).  On the relation between canons of judicial ethics and due process, see Randall T.
Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059
(1996).
173 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. R
174 Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Conse-
quences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 116–17 (2000).
175 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  For contemporaneous comment, see
Paul D. Carrington & H. Jefferson Powell, The Right to Self-Government After Bush v. Gore,
(Duke Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 26, 2001); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (2001).  But see John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775 (2001).  Justice Breyer assures us that the people accepted that result as
demonstrated by the fact that there was no need to summon paratroops to enforce the
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Court gave John Marshall’s explanation of its action: “When contend-
ing parties invoke the process of the courts . . . it becomes our un-
sought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues
the judicial system has been forced to confront.”176  Never mind the
text of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction elsewhere—or the
thousands of parties who every year invoke the Court’s jurisdiction
only to be turned away.
It cannot be viewed as incidental that the five prevailing Justices
in Bush v. Gore supported the contentions of the presidential candi-
date more likely to select future Justices who would share their politics
and support them in their work as superlegislators.  Almost certainly,
concern for the prospective Court’s lack of independence in choosing
the President was the reason the Founders directed the House of Rep-
resentatives to make that choice.  Was this action of the Justices, de-
parting from the text of the Constitution, a demonstration of the
judicial independence that Justices Breyer and O’Connor seek to im-
prove?  Those who voted against the election of President Bush were
not unreasonable if they felt violated by the Court.  Would a different
President have been elected in 2000 if the fifth Justice had, by chance,
been appointed by a Democratic President?  Presumably, Justices
Breyer and O’Connor think not.
III
SECONDARY EFFECTS ON LOWER COURTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S ROLE AS SUPERLEGISLATURE
We do not rest our case for the proposed reform of the Court on
our assessment of the political wisdom advanced by Justices as
superlegislators or even on the reaction of citizens to the enlarged
role the Justices have claimed for themselves.  Even one who approves
all the laws that the Court proclaims may share our concern for the
unforeseen and remote consequences of the Court’s elevated empow-
erment in producing similar effects in lower federal courts.  We here
provide a brief account of those secondary consequences.
judgment. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Independence: Remarks by Justice Breyer, 95 GEO. L.J.
903, 907 (2007).  His view is supported by polling data assembled before the decision was
announced. See Howard Gillman, Judicial Independence Through the Lens of Bush v. Gore:
Four Lessons from Political Science, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 260 (2003).  For a comprehensive
review of commentary on the decision, see CLARKE ROUNTREE, JUDGING THE SUPREME
COURT: CONSTRUCTIONS OF MOTIVES IN BUSH V. GORE (2007).
176 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.  Unnoticed was another utterance of Chief Justice
Marshall: the Court has “no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given.”  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
404 (1821).
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The Judiciary Act of 1922 established the institution now known
as the Judicial Conference of the United States.177  The Chief Justice
chairs the Conference for as long as he holds that office, and he alone
appoints all the members of its many committees.178  Congress ini-
tially organized the Conference merely to study the needs of the
courts, a role that had previously been performed by the Department
of Justice in the Executive Branch.179  Over time, the Conference ac-
quired additional roles, and Congress accorded it increasing defer-
ence.  The result is that the federal judiciary as a whole became not
merely independent, in the constitutional sense of being free to de-
cide cases without fear or hope of reward, but substantially autono-
mous and self-governing with respect to its internal structures and
procedures.
Broadly consequential policies of judicial administration first be-
gan to take form as rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court
under congressional authority conferred in 1934 via the Rules Ena-
bling Act.180  The Civil Rules were promulgated by the Court in 1938
on the advice of an elite committee and were promptly accepted by
Congress.181  In 1939, Congress supplied the Judicial Conference with
its own support staff by the creation of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.182  That office displaced the arm of the De-
partment of Justice that had previously performed that role for the
Attorney General.183  It enabled the Conference (through the Chief
Justice) to deal more directly with Congress in the pursuit of the Con-
ference’s own legislative aims.184  The law governing proceedings in
the federal courts was thereafter promulgated by the Supreme Court
on the advice of the Judicial Conference that acted in turn on the
advice of the committees appointed by the Chief Justice, all with scant
involvement of the Congress or the Executive Branch.
177 Judiciary Act of 1922, ch. 306, sec. 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (2006)).  The Conference is a seldom-noticed council composed of the chief judges
of the federal circuits, who acquire their status as chiefs by seniority in service on their
courts, and other federal judges selected by their colleagues in the circuits or regions that
they represent.
178 Judith Resnik, Democratic Responses to the Breadth of Power of the Chief Justice, in RE-
FORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 5, at 181, 189. R
179 See Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administrative
Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POL. 599, 601–02 (1970).
180 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072–74).  For a discussion on its origins, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1043–98 (1982).
181 The committee drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure included no judges,
but only eminent academics and leaders of the organized bar.  Burbank, supra note 180, at R
1132–37.
182 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223.
183 See Fish, supra note 179, at 601–02. R
184 See id. at 604.
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A consequence of this form of judicial self-government has been
an enormous increase in the support personnel of the federal
courts,185 freeing all the “Article III” judges and Justices from much
work they deem less worthy of their attention.  This development may
be seen as a demonstration of the public choice theory that informs us
that public officials must be expected when permitted, with rare ex-
ception, to make decisions tending to advance their own status and
convenience.186  Even the most publicly motivated officers tend to
conflate the public interest with the powers of their own offices.187
Judges, alas, share our human failings.
The Supreme Court led the way, over time obtaining a staff of
four elite law clerks for each Justice, some of whom would come to
constitute the “cert pool” that we now propose to replace.  Their roles
vary from one Justice to the next, but each Justice’s chamber came to
resemble a small law firm with one senior partner whose less-gratifying
tasks are delegated to very able young lawyers.188  The support of such
a highly qualified staff  has enabled several Justices to retain their of-
fice for years after they have become too disabled to do the work of a
Justice for themselves but have retained sufficient wit to delegate their
work to their staffs.189  And it seems to have provided the Court with a
185 See Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 605–13 (2005).
186 For an account of the theory, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (exploring the applications of
public choice to legal issues).  On its application to the judiciary, see Charles Gardner
Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996) (evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the public choice
theory with respect to federal judges); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice,
and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that federal judges can
create procedural rules that reflect their own self-interest because they have control over
the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
187 Over a period of forty years, the authors have worked closely with scores of federal
judges and attest that every one of them was highly professional and dedicated to the
public interest.  But judges, like professors or lawyers or doctors, do tend, when sharing a
public responsibility, to agree that the future status of their group is an important and
often dominant consideration.
188 There have been times when clerks’ roles were elevated by disabilities of aging
Justices requiring greater delegation.
The post-1970 era . . . has featured two especially stark examples of judicial
failure: the publicly visible mental disability of Justice William O. Douglas in
1975 following a serious stroke, and the far less dramatic scandal of Justice
Harry A. Blackmun increasingly allowing his law clerks to hold greater and
greater sway over his opinions during the 1980s and early 1990s.  In addi-
tion, at least three other justices since 1970—Hugo Black, Lewis Powell,
Thurgood Marshall—have suffered mental decrepitude that seriously im-
paired their ability to do their jobs . . . .
David J. Garrow, Protecting and Enhancing the U.S. Supreme Court, in REFORMING THE COURT:
TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURTS JUSTICES, supra note 5, at 271, 273 (citations omitted). R
189 See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 161–63 (1984); LINDA
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 148–49, 176–79 (2005); David J. Garrow,
Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U.
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substantial political constituency, for its former clerks are likely to ap-
prove the empowerment of the Justices they served.
As the elite and celebrated institution, or “crown jewel,” of our
judiciary, the Supreme Court serves as a model for lower courts.  The
staffs of circuit judges and district judges, like those of the Justices,
have also been substantially enlarged.  Central staff lawyers and ad-
ministrators in every circuit serve to assist in identifying those matters
or issues worthy of the attention of Article III judges.190  Each circuit
judge is assisted by three or four highly qualified law clerks.  This
evolution has enabled federal judges to be more selective about their
work, to delegate more to subordinates, and to conduct a legal pro-
cess that is, like that of the Supreme Court, far less transparent than
that conducted by their predecessors a few decades ago.
The authors of the Judiciary Act of 1891, which created the inter-
mediate appellate courts, envisioned these courts as institutions assur-
ing litigants who were dissatisfied with decisions of the formerly
“kingly” federal trial judges that their appeals would receive the care-
ful attention of three Article III judges.191  Every litigant was afforded
a right to appeal that created an expectation of an oral hearing at
which the judges responsible for the decision would appear in person
and engage in discourse with counsel to appraise critically the judg-
ment under review.192  In due course, the judges hearing the case
would publish a decision with an opinion justifying their action and
incidentally giving public notice of their personal attention to the par-
ties’ contentions.  Citizens whose rights were upheld or denied were
thus assured that their concerns had been considered by thoughtful,
independent judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate to hear and decide their cases.  And others could see that this
had happened.  This expectation was indeed universally shared for
many decades.
But those procedural amenities have vanished in many cases de-
cided by the courts of appeals.193  One undoubted reason has been
the obligation acquired by those courts to entertain many appeals
presenting no seriously contested issues: these include many routine
appeals in federal criminal cases, made plentiful by the mandated
CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000) (providing multiple examples of ailing Justices relying heavily on
their clerks); David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF. May–June 2005, at
26.
190 For a summary listing of all the positions for which a young lawyer might apply, see
Online System for Clerkship Application & Review (OSCAR), http://
lawclerks.ao.uscourts.gov.
191 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
192 Decline of the institution of oral argument was first marked by Charles R. Haworth,
Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q.
257, 265–69.
193 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 75, at 771. R
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-3\CRN301.txt unknown Seq: 35  3-MAR-09 11:31
2009] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EXCESS 621
right to counsel; and petitions by state and federal prisoners seeking
belatedly to challenge their convictions or to gain some improvement
in the conditions of their incarceration.194  The abrupt and non-trans-
parent procedure of courts of appeals in most criminal or prisoner
cases now resembles in its brevity that of the Supreme Court in its
summary denials of certiorari.  Equally lacking in transparency are ap-
pellate decisions in many other cases deemed undeserving of the full
attention of Article III judges.  It seems that many cases present no
questions of law sufficiently interesting to the circuit judges to moti-
vate them to give the personal attention required to provide the tradi-
tional transparency that results from deliberation and decision.
A contributing cause of the decline of transparency in federal ap-
pellate proceedings has been a steady growth in the preoccupation of
circuit judges and their law clerks with the publication of suitably long
and learned opinions proclaiming the “law of the circuit” that lower
courts and prospective litigants within their jurisdictions are expected
to obey.  The vision of a regionalized national law made by circuit
judges evolved gradually.  It first became a concern when circuit
courts of appeals were expanded to more than three circuit judges,
creating a risk of dissonance between diverse panels.195  En banc pro-
cedure to promote harmony among panels was a device that the
judges themselves fashioned;196 Congress approved en banc proceed-
ings only after the Supreme Court confirmed the implied authority of
all five judges of the Third Circuit to sit together.197  Neither Congress
nor the Court gave much consideration to the secondary implications
of the “law of the circuit” or to its likely effectiveness in a circuit of
many judges.  These questions were raised repeatedly in the last third
of the twentieth century by august and well-qualified groups of lawyers
and judges summoned to consider the problems of the federal appel-
late courts.198  This reinforces a sense on the part of at least some
194 Id. at 352–69; see also JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
351–79 (8th ed. 2006) (discussing the various types of additional litigation that prisoners
may pursue after incarceration).  See generally RICHARD L. LIPPKE, RETHINKING IMPRISON-
MENT (2007).  The precipitate growth in prisoner petitions is, in large measure, a result of
the vast increase in the number of persons incarcerated in the United States, which is a
secondary consequence of the “war” on drugs.
195 See Lamar Alexander, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodat-
ing Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 578 (1965).
196 Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 334 n.14 (1941).  In Lang’s Estate
v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1938), the court had held that it could not
sit in panels larger than three.
197 Congress approved the practice in 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 46, 62
Stat. 869, 871 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006)). See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v.
W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250–51 (1953).
198 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 32; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 32; R
Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, supra note 32, at R
206–07; Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, supra
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circuit judges that lawmaking as mini–supreme court justices, or semi-
superlegislators, may be the primary duty and concern of federal cir-
cuit judges.
Even if each circuit court of appeals were able to maintain coher-
ent federal law for its territory, the conflicts between the circuits im-
part an additional and useless complexity to the national law.199
Insofar as the national law is enacted to facilitate legal planning,
knowledge of the law of one circuit is seldom an adequate basis for
planning.  Erwin Griswold noted over a half century ago that it is un-
just to decentralize tax appeals;200 everyone should pay the same fed-
eral taxes, and equality can be achieved only if the interpretation of
the Internal Revenue Code is placed in the hands of a single federal
appellate court.  Especially inasmuch as any judge-made “law of the
circuit” is subject to revision not only by the court that proclaimed it,
but by other panels of that circuit as well as the Supreme Court and by
the other branches of the national government, the law of the circuit
is seldom a reliable basis for planning legal transactions or relation-
ships.  Disregarding such unsettling consequences, the Supreme
Court has in recent decades left many, many questions unresolved,
despite conflicts in circuit court opinions.201  Justice Byron White,
among others, was outspoken in his disapproval of this practice,202 but
it remains in place.203  Given that the current members of the Court
note 32, at 34–36; Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, supra note 32, at R
574–75. Among the eminent advocates of restructuring the federal judiciary have been
American Bar Association presidents (e.g., Bernard Siegel and Leon Jaworski), eminent
federal judges (e.g., Carl McGowan, Thurgood Marshall, and Edward Becker), eminent
scholars (e.g., Paul Freund, Alexander Bickel, and Maurice Rosenberg) and congressional
leaders (e.g., Senator Roman Hruska).
199 Judge Posner has suggested that conflict resolution might be a task to be under-
taken by the American Law Institute:
The simplification of law was one of the Institute’s original goals, and it is
one that would be well served by the Institute’s undertaking to monitor the
thousands of appellate decisions, state and federal, handed down every year
for conflicts on technical points of law and to propose solutions that I pre-
dict would be welcomed by courts and legislatures.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 308–09 (1999).
200 See Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1173 (1944) (arguing that the only “sensible system of court review of tax cases is to have a
unified appellate procedure”).
201 United States Law Week compiles a list annually. See, e.g., Circuit Splits Recently Noted in
Law Week—4th Quarter 2007, 76 U.S. L. WK. 1381, 1381–84 (2008).
202 See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1038–40 (1990) (White, J., dis-
senting); Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S. 913, 915 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
203 In 2005, the Judicial Conference presumed to declare which circuit had the right
answer to questions of law on which there was disagreement. See Jacob Scott, Comment,
Article III En Banc: The Judicial Conference as an Advisory Intercircuit Court of Appeals, 116 YALE
L.J. 1625, 1628–31 (2007).  This was not an acceptable role for the Conference to play, not
least because it had no jurisdiction to decide cases and no “case or controversy” had been
presented to it.  That the Conference nevertheless attempted to provide a solution does
signify the reality of the problem of circuit conflict.
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are all veterans of service on the intermediate courts, they may per-
haps be expected to prefer not to deprive their former colleagues of
the greater satisfactions of sitting as semi-superlegislators.204  A tertiary
consequence of the instability of the national law is the temptation
posed to the Justices to write ever longer opinions invoking ever
broader propositions of law that others may or may not read to resolve
diverse future cases.  And circuit judges face the same temptation.
The ambition of the circuit judges to make law in the manner of
the Justices is reflected in their practice of writing opinions for non-
publication.  To semi-superlegislators, the humble roles of the judicial
opinion, as an explanation to the parties of the result in their case and
as a demonstration that independent judges have thought about their
contentions, are entitled to less professional attention than their work
as lawmakers.  And so non-publication of decisions by panels of circuit
judges became the order of the day.  It was stated that such expres-
sions by judges were not statements of law binding on their colleagues
but were intended to be applicable only to the case at hand and to be
read only by the parties and their counsel.
It has been evident for some time that the circuit judges them-
selves, when sitting in panels of three, may not be as faithful to the
precedents set by their colleagues sitting on other three-judge panels
of the same circuit as they are expected to be in adhering to the
precedents established by the Supreme Court.205  Fine distinctions
204 The contention is sometimes advanced that it is a good thing to let issues of na-
tional law “percolate” in the various circuits before the Supreme Court burdens itself with
resolving the conflict. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). See generally Cordray & Cordray, supra note 112, at 437–39 (discussing R
different Justices’ views both for and against “percolation”).  This notion, however, was
ridiculed by Justice Rehnquist.  William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme
Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1986).  Justice White was even more dismissive. See
Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J.
346, 349 (1982); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1283, 1285 (2003) (“Byron White was an ‘activist’ Justice only in his unswerving view
that the Court ought not let circuit splits linger, that it should say what the federal law is
sooner rather than later.”); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice
White and the Role of the Supreme Court, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003).  Justice
O’Connor has also been critical of this type of “percolation” in certain cases. See Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 378–79 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  No state has opted for the
idea of percolation, and it seems unlikely that anyone would propose such a scheme to
Congress or any other legislature.  Although much empirical work has been done on the
Court’s selection of cases, no example has yet been found of a legal issue that the Court
resolved more wisely because it was left to percolate at the expense of citizens burdened by
the continuing uncertainty and the cost of litigation.
205 Sixty-eight percent of the district judges participating in a survey disagreed with the
statement, “There is consistency between panels considering the same issue.”  Paul D. Car-
rington, The Obsolescence of the United States Court of Appeals: Roscoe Pound’s Structural Solution,
15 J.L. & POL. 515, 519 n.13 (1999) (citing NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SURVEY OF
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES REGARDING U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 4
(1987) (conducted by the Office of the Circuit Executive)).
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may be drawn, or a case may be decided with an unpublished decision
making no reference to a discernable conflict with a prior opinion
published in the name of the same court.206  Non-publication may
thus serve to mask non-law.  Several circuits prohibit counsel from cit-
ing such material, and most discourage such citations.  In 2000, Judge
Richard Arnold issued a vigorous opinion declaring such a prohibi-
tion to be a violation of the First Amendment; the Eighth Circuit ren-
dered his decision in that case moot, but his opinion was not without
effect.207  The complaint of lawyers was that the practice, by denying
transparency to the appellate process, relieved the appellate judges of
accountability for their fidelity to preexisting law.  After a decade of
protest by the bar, the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court
addressed the issue in a rule proclaiming the right to cite all circuit
court decisions.208
That rule took effect in 2007;209 one observer predicted that this
would result in a “sea change” in the practices of federal appellate
courts.210  But who can be seen reading unpublished opinions or
briefs citing unpublished opinions?  One lawyer sitting on the Appel-
late Rules Committee pronounced them to be “junk law.”211  Few if
any cases can be found in which a court of appeals decision is ex-
plained by adherence to the precedent established by an unpublished
opinion.
Also in the fashion of the Supreme Court, limited evidence indi-
cates that many federal appellate judges delegate much of their re-
sponsibility for matters of lesser interest to the staffs of their courts or
to their personal staffs.  Knowing observers assume that it must be so.
206 See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157, 181–84 (discussing In re Tseng Labs, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1024
(E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d mem., 107 F.3d 8 (3d Cir. 1997), in which the Third Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment without discussing a potential conflict with
previous Third Circuit decisions).
207 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated as
moot, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]hether unpublished opinions
have precedential effect no longer has any relevance for the decision of this tax-refund
case.”).
208 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a).
209 See id. The Court so ordered on April 12, 2006.
210 This observer was Chief Judge John Walker of the Second Circuit.  Tony Mauro,
Green Light to Cite Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, April 19, 2004, at 8.  Alex Konzinski,
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, testified to the House Judiciary Committee that unpub-
lished opinions are “simply a letter to the parties telling them who won and who lost, and
why.”  Issuing such opinions instead of full-blown rulings requiring many drafts, Kozinski
said, “frees us up to spend the time that needs to be spent on published opinions, the ones
that actually shape the law.”  Tony Mauro, Courts Move Forward on Citation Change, LEGAL
TIMES, May 26, 2003, at 8 [hereinafter Mauro, Courts Move Forward].  But his “simple letter”
is the judicial task—to which shaping the law is a coincidental consequence and not the
primary mission of this semi-superlegislature.
211 Mauro, Courts Move Forward, supra note 210. R
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Indeed, Judge Posner, who surely knows, has affirmed that “[m]any
appellate judges have never actually written a judicial opinion.”212  We
know that each circuit judge, like each Justice, is served by the ablest
recent graduates of the most prestigious law schools, many of whom
feel well qualified to make any political decisions needing to be
made.213  Assistance is also provided by substantial central staffs that
did not exist as recently as 1960.  The visible differences between a
court and an administrative agency have declined.
All of this is not to say that U.S. circuit judges have lost all sense
of obligation to obey and enforce preexisting law.  They do a lot of
that.214  But the effect of the Supreme Court as a role model trickles
down.  A similar transformation of the judges’ mission has also oc-
curred in the federal trial courts, contributing to a comparable loss of
transparency in proceedings at that level.  Trials at which adversaries
present evidence in public have become rare events in federal court-
houses.215  There are several obvious reason for this, but others may
be a result of the transformation of the judicial role at the higher
levels.
One obvious cause for the decline of criminal trials has been con-
gressional legislation on sentencing that the Court has recently held
excessive in its restraints on the discretion of the sentencing judge.216
Severe mandatory sentences make it so risky for an accused person to
seek a trial at which evidence would be heard that most federal crimi-
nal cases have been—and will continue to be—resolved by plea
bargaining.
But the number of civil trials has been declining almost as rap-
idly.  One obvious cause has been the establishment by the Supreme
Court of a “national policy favoring arbitration.”217  Congress has
212 Posner, supra note 18, at 61. R
213 See L.A. Powe, Jr., “Marble Palace, We’ve Got A Problem—With You”, in REFORMING THE
COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 5, at 99, 102. R
214 See generally FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
(2007); HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS (2007) (an extended description of the
courts’ concerns with the law of appellate jurisdiction).
215 See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (describing a
steady decline in both the number of trials and percentage of cases terminated by trial in
the American judicial system between 1962 and 2002).
216 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (holding that Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment because they require judges to im-
pose sentences based on facts not presented to the jury).
217 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).  The “policy”
was first declared in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983).  In 1985, the Court proclaimed, contrary to its legislative history, that the Act
reflected a “congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered.”
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985).
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never approved any such “national policy,” and it weakens private en-
forcement of laws enacted by Congress or state legislatures.218  Cer-
tainly, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 expressed no such policy219
as understood at the time of its enactment or during the half century
that followed.  That statute was enacted for the purpose of enabling
contract disputes between businessmen engaged in interstate com-
merce to be resolved more amiably and economically.220  But the “na-
tional policy” that the Court established favors the enforcement even
of arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts signed by pay-day
borrowers that are on their face criminally usurious, are invalid under
applicable state law, and that effectively deny the borrower access to a
forum that might hear his claim.221
Congress has in recent times authorized the federal courts to use
arbitration as an alternative method of resolving disputes in cases filed
in federal courts, but only if litigants have “freely and knowingly” con-
sented to arbitration of an existing dispute.222  This standard was not
applied by federal courts enforcing the “national policy” proclaimed
by the Justices and established in contracts of adhesion.  The only
other relevant statements of Congress have been an enactment in
2002 assuring automobile dealers judicial enforcement of their rights
against automobile manufacturers notwithstanding the arbitration
clauses in their franchise agreements223 and another in 2008 provid-
ing a similar assurance to farmers growing livestock under contract
with processing firms.224  The law protecting automobile dealers, how-
ever, does not protect consumers who buy automobiles from the same
dealers with printed bills of sale containing arbitration clauses, be-
cause the Court has decreed that these must be observed even against
consumers who are suing in a state court to enforce a state law en-
218 California law conferring rights on franchisees was made subject to preemption by
the Federal Arbitration Act in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 8 (1984).
219 Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
220 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 102–21 (1992).
221 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 440.
222 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 6, 112 Stat. 2293,
2995–96, (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)) (amending the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988)).
223 21ST CENTURY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, § 11,028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835–36 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226
(2006)).  This statute overruled Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985).  Senators Grassley and Feingold introduced a bill in the Senate that would
have  provided the same terms for growers of livestock and poultry.  See infra note 224.  It R
was reported from committee but never brought to a vote by the full Senate.  Library of
Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:s221: (last visited
Jan. 22, 2009).
224 Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2007, S. 221, 110th Cong. (2007).
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acted for their protection.225  No one has tried to write a Court opin-
ion explaining to citizens this “national policy” favoring dealers and
disfavoring their customers.  No one who publicly takes responsibility
for such law could be elected to public office.  Congress has not so far
moved to correct the situation because there is no organization able
or willing to spend the political capital required to secure the enact-
ment of such a law.  Such a law would protect unorganized consumers
against dealers who contribute to political campaigns.226
In addition to the rise of arbitration, procedural reforms initiated
by the Judicial Conference have steadily enlarged the discretion of the
judge in the conduct of proceedings.227  Among the new staff added
to the federal district courts were those designated as magistrate
judges or as bankruptcy judges; these are almost equal in number to
Article III judges and exercise almost all the powers of a judge, but
they are selected by their Article III colleagues, serve only limited
terms, and make only the decisions delegated to them.228  The ready
acceptance of term limits for those officers is not easily reconciled
with objections to term limits for the Article III Justices and judges
themselves, but it assures their subordination to the Article III judges.
Also, the role of special masters and other “neutrals” appointed
by district judges has been enlarged.  This enlargement better enables
them to assist the judges appointing them to serve in specific cases to
receive evidence and recommend resolution of issues.229  The Article
III judge was thus moved off the trial bench for most of his or her
service, and into an executive office to give directions to subordinates.
In lieu of trials, the district judges and their staffs tend to practice
“managerial judging,”230 a process by which they seek, by diverse
225 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that “Congress . . .
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration”).
226 See Press Release, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, Sen. Feingold, Rep. Johnson Intro-
duce Measure to Preserve Consumer Justice (July 12, 2007), http://feingold.senate.gov/
record.cfm?id=307045.
227 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 631.
228 First approved by Congress in the Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82
Stat. 1107 (1968), (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–39), then upheld in Northern Pipe-
line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  However, Justices White
and Powell and Chief Justice Burger found the majority decision upholding the law to have
read Article III out of the Constitution. Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
229 FED. R. CIV. P. 53.  See James S. DeGraw, Note, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institu-
tional Reform: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 801, 808 (1991).
230 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliche´s Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 1003–07, 1016 (2003); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The
Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
783, 827, 830 (2004); Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked for, Getting What We Paid for,
and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943,
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methods,231 to facilitate settlements and avoid the necessity of making
decisions that might burden a court of appeals with the need to review
their judgments.232  Or, if a decision on the merits must be made, to
render it in the form of a summary judgment, ruling one party’s pro-
posed evidence to be legally insufficient and hence unworthy of being
heard, a procedure that spares the trial judge the need to see and
hear witnesses, but still enables him or her to expound the controlling
law.233  Why, Judge Patrick Higginbotham has asked, do we still call
them “trial courts”?234  In their remoteness to, and seeming lack of
interest in, litigants seeking their personal attention, twenty-first cen-
tury district judges may be thought to resemble their nineteenth-cen-
tury antecedents, who were said to exercise “kingly power” over
litigants whose cases were decided in their courts.235
The Supreme Court has also contributed to the disappearance
from federal courtrooms of federal district judges sitting in civil cases
by its decisions reinterpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that were earlier promulgated by the Court itself.  In 1986, it decided
a trilogy of cases forsaking the text of Rule 56, and its own prior state-
ments on the subject, to encourage more frequent use of summary
judgments, foreclosing trials.236  Judge Patricia Wald, reviewing a dec-
ade of experience with the Court’s pronouncements, observed that
the practice of rendering summary judgment was no longer restricted
to frivolous or sham cases, for the rule had, without modification of its
text, been transformed into “a potential juggernaut” to dispose of civil
cases without trial.237
963–67 (2004) (discussing the increase of settlements driven by expensive pretrial fact in-
vestigation, and the resulting low level of public investment in judicial officers).
231 For an account of the diverse methods of encouraging settlement without trial, see
Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How
They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten Important Values, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 303.
232 The extraordinary rise of plea bargaining between the prosecutor and the accused
is a major part of this development. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 2 (2003) (“[A]lthough we can find many worthy
accounts of why the jury fell, we must ask instead why plea bargaining triumphed.”).
233 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see Miller, supra note 230, at 1055–56 (“Clearly, Rule 56 has R
evolved . . . into a powerful tool for judges to control dockets and respond to the supposed
‘litigation explosion.’” (footnotes omitted)).
234 Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 S.M.U. L. REV.
1405 (2002).
235 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. R
236 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–88 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 245–50 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judg-
ment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
591, 623 (2004).
237 Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998).
Empirical data tends to confirm Wald’s account. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of
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In 2007, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,238 the Court reinter-
preted Rule 8 to substantially enlarge the power of the district judge
to enter judgment on the pleadings, thereby foreclosing not only trial
but also discovery when the judge senses that discovery will be expen-
sive and not likely to bear fruit.  Although the Court emphasized that
the case before it was a potentially complex antitrust case, Justice Ste-
vens’ dissent rightly observed that this is precisely the sort of case for
which discovery has long been deemed of special importance—be-
cause “‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspira-
tors.’”239  No recent decision of the Court better illustrates the
disconnection of the Justices from the realities of the courtroom or
the legislative chamber.  The Sherman Act of 1890 provided a reward
of treble damages to encourage private plaintiffs to step forward as
private enforcers of a public law; that provision reflected Congress’s
appreciation of the evidentiary problems faced by those seeking to
enforce its prohibitions.240  The Court’s 2007 decision substantially di-
minished the prospects that the law will in the future be successfully
enforced by private plaintiffs.  Lower courts have extended the princi-
ple to apply to all civil cases; thus, in many federal courts, cases do not
go to trial if the judge finds the complaint to be implausible.241  In-
deed, in combination with its 1986 trilogy, this decision substantially
repudiates a major theme of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the amendments promulgated by the Court and accepted by
Congress over the years.  That theme had been to constrain trial
judges from premature dispositions and thus protect the rights of citi-
zens to have their cases adequately heard in federal courtrooms by
Article III judges.
Thus, at all levels, the Justices and judges “holding office” under
the Constitution are increasingly preoccupied with making political
decisions and are diminishingly concerned with the humdrum task of
enforcing the preexisting applicable law to disputed facts or with as-
suring litigants that their interests have been seriously considered by
members of an independent judiciary.  This is an inversion of the con-
stitutional scheme federal courts were established to maintain—an in-
version that those voting for the Judiciary Act of 1925 did not
foresee—and even an inversion of procedural rules resulting from the
Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861
(2007).
238 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–69 (2007).
239 Id. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Tr. of Rex Hosp.,
425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)).
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2964
(2008); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2008). But
see Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17  (D.C. Cir.
2008).
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creation of the Judicial Conference in 1922 and the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934.
This inversion is not, to be sure, solely the result of the transfor-
mation of the Supreme Court into a superlegislature.  But the trans-
formation of the Supreme Court is almost certainly a factor in the
transformation of the courts of appeals and the district courts.  In-
deed, the Court as superlegislature, in making the law governing the
proceedings of lower courts, has demeaned the value of transparency.
It has helped make the lower federal courts more like itself.
IV
A  REFORM TO PROVIDE A “CERT POOL” SERVING FOR
“GOOD BEHAVIOR”
We turn now to some details of our specific proposal to reinstate
some of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction by withdrawing much of
its discretion to select the cases it decides.  When Congress approved
the 1925 Act, the Court was hearing about 300 cases a year and af-
firming others on their merits without need of hearing.242  Congress
was assured that the number would not be substantially reduced and
that the Court would separately confer on each decision to deny ple-
nary review.243  But the Court, with the help of the panel of young law
clerks established by the Justices to assist them in deciding which ques-
tions are most worthy of their attention,244 has now reduced its wor-
kload to about 80 selected cases a year.245
Chief Justice Taft, the champion of status and discretion for Jus-
tices, did not invent law clerks.  Their presence is, in some measure, a
secondary consequence of the advent of the elite, academically pre-
tentious, professional law school in the last decades of the nineteenth
century.246  By Taft’s time, some Justices had concluded that a tal-
ented and self-assured young law graduate could be more useful than
an ordinary file clerk.
242 For a graph of the caseload, see Sternberg, supra note 17, at 5. R
243 Then–Solicitor General, James M. Beck, testifying on behalf of the legislation at
Taft’s request, “estimated that the number of cases of public gravity that the Court could
decide on the merits was between four hundred and five hundred” per year.  Hartnett,
supra note 17, at 1646. R
244 For recent accounts of the present role of law clerks, see TODD C. PEPPERS, COURT-
IERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK
191–205 (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 109–49 (2006); Cordray & Cordray,
supra note 17, at 791. R
245 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10 (2008),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf.  The
Chief Justices’ year-end reports from 2000 on are available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
246 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S, at 60–64 (1983).
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The “cert pool” is an institution that has evolved in recent de-
cades and appears to have had a significant effect in diminishing the
likelihood that a petition for certiorari will gain the four votes re-
quired to secure a place on the Court’s agenda.247  Most law clerks
come to the Court after a year of service to a circuit judge, and most
remain with a Justice for a single year before going on to a career
elsewhere.248  Each law clerk in the pool is selected by a Justice to be a
member of his or her personal staff, but some are then assigned to the
“pool” to read the petitions and responses and strive objectively to
discern the reasons why petitions should be denied.
Justice Stevens was the one Justice who did not assign one of his
clerks to the pool.  He has expressed the view that an excessive delega-
tion is involved, and that the pool is an important cause of the reduc-
tion in the number of petitions that are granted.249  In 2008, Justice
Alito joined Justice Stevens in his withdrawal from the pool.250  Memo-
randa written by cert pool clerks are read in the chambers of each of
the Justices who are members of the pool, but these memoranda are
only occasionally discussed in the Justices’ private conferences.  As
noted, the reasons animating the Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions
are of a diverse political nature and are sometimes instrumental in
nature.251  Surely as Judge Posner confirms,252 they strive to use their
power to serve the public good, but that good is identified through
their own moral and political lenses.253  And they strive to avoid work
they deem unworthy of their attention.  The task assigned to the tal-
ented juniors is therefore complex.  Each clerk is free to add his or
her own recommendation, but a clerk writing such a memorandum is
247 PEPPERS, supra note 244, at 194 (“As soon as I am confident that my new law clerks R
are reliable, I take their word and that of the pool memo writer as to the underlying facts and
contentions of the parties in the various petitions.” (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist)
(footnote omitted)); WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 244, at 143–44 (arguing that an increase R
in cert petitions, a growing reliance by the Justices on the clerks’ recommendations, and
the cautiousness of clerks when recommending a grant of certiorari have contributed to a
decline in grants).
248 PEPPERS, supra note 244, at 31. R
249 WARD & WEIDEN, note 244, at 143. R
250 Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The “Cert Pool”, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A21.
251 For accounts, see RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1991); PERRY.
supra note 114; DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME R
COURT (1980).
252 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269–323 (2008); see also FRANK M. COF-
FIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 281–85 (1994).
253 An empirical demonstration is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  And increasingly in recent years, the Justices
have invoked their own notions of the public good in disregard of the stated aims of legis-
lators expressed by committees or draftsmen who proposed and advocated enactments. See
genrally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009).
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at risk of misleading the Justices into granting certiorari in a case that
they later regret deciding.  That would call the young clerk’s judg-
ment into question.  The pool clerks are therefore motivated to over-
look no reason why a particular petition should be denied.254
So light has the workload of the Justices become that a veteran
observer of the Court was recently moved to observe that if the Justices
were employed in the private sector they would all have received pink
slips.255  Ample time is left to the Justices to write books, lecture,
teach, and travel abroad.  Plainly, the Court could decide many more
cases than it does; Justice White thought that 150 cases a year256 was
the right number; Justice Brennan agreed.257  Our proposal would
cause a substantial increase in the number of cases decided each year
but would not impose that high a number of cases on the Court.
We would replace the “cert pool” of law clerks with a panel of
experienced federal judges.  These judges would be empowered to
hear all petitions for certiorari and evaluate the petitions on the basis
of standards supplied by Congress.  They would place a specified and
substantial number of cases on the docket of the Court, and the Court
would be obligated to decide these cases on their merits.  We tenta-
tively designate the group as the Certiorari Division of the Supreme
Court.  Specifically, we suggest that a group of thirteen Article III
judges be assigned the task of selecting perhaps as many as 120 cases a
term that the Court would be obliged to decide in the manner of Mar-
bury v. Madison.  One member of the group might be drawn from each
of the regional circuits to preclude suspicion of geographical bias.
They might be selected automatically by a principle enacted by Con-
gress.  This service could, for example, be performed for limited part-
time terms by circuit judges with at least ten years of federal judicial
experience.  All members of this Certiorari Division would still have
ample time to bear a substantial share of the regular duties of circuit
judges.  Senior Justices who have retired from regular duty on the
Court might also be asked to sit in the Division.258
We envision that five members of the Division would be sum-
moned in regularly scheduled sessions by the Clerk of the Supreme
Court to meet and rule on pending certiorari petitions.  It would be
254 WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 244, at 132. R
255 Philip Allen Lacovara, The Incredible Shrinking Court, AM. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 53.
256 Byron R. White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary Reflec-
tions, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 277 (1982).
257 William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Workload, 66 JUDICATURE
230, 231 (1983).
258 This would be especially appropriate if the Justices were limited to eighteen-year
terms, as we have previously urged. See supra note 24; see also Steven G. Calabresi & James R
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE
COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 5, at 15, 50–51. R
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-3\CRN301.txt unknown Seq: 47  3-MAR-09 11:31
2009] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EXCESS 633
the duty of the Clerk to transmit petitions as they are received to the
members of the next incoming panel.  Their duty roster would be de-
signed, perhaps by the Judicial Conference of the United States, to
rotate the duty so that membership of the panels would not be con-
stant.  A circuit judge summoned to certiorari duty in three annual
terms might thereafter be returned to full duty in the circuit and re-
placed by a colleague.
It would be the duty of the members of the Certiorari Division at
each session to grant an appropriate number of pending certiorari
petitions in accord with standards expressed by Congress.  Given that
the Court’s present practice purporting to set standards for the exer-
cise of this power is “hopelessly indeterminate and unilluminating,”259
Congress or the Judicial Conference should be able to improve the
law governing those decisions.  It might prudently, as Justice White so
long urged,260 give priority to the resolution of conflicts in the inter-
pretation of federal law by the courts of appeals and to substantial
issues of federal constitutional law presented by the decisions of the
highest state courts.
We do not propose to prevent the Supreme Court from overrul-
ing a denial of certiorari by the Certiorari Division.  Given the Court’s
workload and the dynamics of the situation, this would seem likely to
be an infrequent event, but history indicates that the Justices could
pick another hundred cases if they were highly motivated to do so.261
They would also retain the power to grant a petition for certiorari in
order to vacate a judgment and remand the case to the lower court to
revise its judgment in light of recent developments.  Perhaps the Cer-
tioriari Division might on some occasions recommend that course to
the Court.262
The Certiorari Division would not write or publish an opinion to
explain why a petition was granted, but an individual member of the
ruling panel would be allowed to opine or dissent.  A dissenting opin-
ion might attract the interest of the Justices, who might then grant a
petition that was not granted by the Division.  The personal law clerks
of the Justices might independently identify a case that their Justice
might seek to bring before the Court.
Our proposal bears a resemblance to five others that were ad-
dressed to Congress by serious and honorable groups over the last
259 Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 113.  The stated rule is Supreme Court Rule 10. R
For a discussion of the rule and a critique of its indeterminate articulation of grounds for
granting certiorari, see id. at 711–12.
260 See cases cited supra note 202. R
261 See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. R
262 The practice is not without difficulty.  For a critique, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—And an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
Mar. 2009).
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four decades.263  Those proposals shared the premise that the present
structure of the federal judiciary is inappropriate and ought to be re-
vised to assure more effective oversight of lower federal courts and
administrative agencies.  All five envisioned the creation of another
national court to share the responsibilities presently borne by the Jus-
tices alone.264  The institution we here propose would not be another
court because it would neither make final decisions on the merits of
cases nor publish opinions of the court.
Richard Arnold observed that “the courts, like the rest of the gov-
ernment, depend on the consent of the governed,” and they need
often to be reminded of that dependence.265  Our present proposal is
a response to his wise advice.  It promises at least five important bene-
fits.  First, and most important in our view, the restructuring of the
certiorari process would restore the Supreme Court to the more judi-
cial and less legislative role that it generally performed prior to 1925.
The Justices, like real judges, would have to decide many cases placed
on their docket.  This would partially restore the validity of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s justification of the Court’s power to review legislation,
that it is obliged under Article III to decide cases and can only decide
them in compliance with the text of the overriding Constitution.266
We would hope that thus restored to the role of a law court, the Su-
preme Court might rediscover the virtues of humility and acquies-
cence that Jefferson Powell has identified as the moral dimensions of
the Justices’ work.267  Perhaps it might also serve to scale down the
excessively elevated expectations of the legal profession observed by
Robert Nagel.268
Second, relieving the Justices of the certiorari task they currently
perform would provide them with increased time to decide a larger
number of cases that raise important issues of national law.  The
Court so structured could be expected to leave fewer conflicts in the
263 See supra note 32. R
264 See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, supra note 32, R
at 236–38 (proposing the creation of the National Court of Appeals); Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 32, at 40–44, 64–66 R
(proposing organizing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into regional adjudication divi-
sions and authorizing any circuit to establish district court appellate panels); Study Group
on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, supra note 32, at 590–95 (proposing the creation of R
a National Court of Appeals).
265 Judge Richard Arnold, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Address at the
Arkansas Bar Foundation Symposium on the Judiciary, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE JUDICIARY 12,
12 (Patricia A. Eables & John P. Gill eds., 1989) (available at the University of Arkansas at
Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law Library).
266 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. R
267 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. R
268 See NAGEL, supra note 104, at 121–23 (discussing how legal training and practice R
contribute to lawyers’ perception of judicial decisions as occupying a “superior domain of
rational thought”).
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interpretation of federal law of the sort that have increasingly plagued
the system.269  There would be a reduced need for courts of appeals to
sit en banc.  This in turn would ease the problems associated with the
appointment of additional circuit judges needed to give proper and
transparent attention to all the appeals filed in their courts.
Third, the new arrangement would vest the power to select a
large part of the Court’s cases in judges who are in the best position to
know what issues of national law are most in need of authoritative
attention: the veteran circuit judges who are the object of the Court’s
oversight and who have experience sitting on three-judge panels.
Fourth, we hope that our proposal will be perceived as an eleva-
tion of the status and authority of circuit judges, many of whom might
expect to serve a three-year term on a division of the Supreme Court
responsible for identifying the issues of national law needing authori-
tative resolution.
Finally, this reform would provide a modest measure of trans-
parency to the Court’s decisions to select cases for review and would
reduce the influence on the selection process of instrumental consid-
erations of the sort to which the public choice theory adverts.  One
might indeed view the proposed device as a source of judicial inde-
pendence; those selecting the cases for the Court to decide would sel-
dom if ever have the professional stake in their decisions that the
Justices inevitably have.  Judges sitting on a Certiorari Division panel
would also be tempted to be instrumental in their choices of cases, but
these temptations would not be constant or persistent.  The increased
transparency in case selection might also encourage a restoration of
transparency in the proceedings in the lower courts.  More oral argu-
ments in the courts of appeals, at least in electronic form, might be
provided.270
269 In 1975, a national commission concluded that “unnecessary and undesirable un-
certainty” concerning federal law was a major problem.  Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, supra note 32, at 217.  Too many unresolved inter-circuit R
conflicts resulted in differing law being applied in different states.  Delay in the resolution
of many issues for federal law imposed costs and resulted in “years of uncertainty, confu-
sion and . . . forum shopping by litigants.” Id. at 218.  Since 1975, the number of certiorari
petitions filed each year has more than doubled and the total number decisions of all
federal courts of appeals has more than tripled.  The Supreme Court, which decided about
175 cases a year on the merits in 1975, was then reviewing fewer than one percent of the
cases decided by the federal courts of appeals—a percentage that many informed persons
thought was inadequate to provide needed supervision and guidance.  Today, the Court
decides less than one-tenth of one percent of the approximately 10,000 filings per year
from all federal and state courts, nearly all of which are certiorari petitions.  See SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S., THE JUSTICES’ CASELOAD, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/jus-
ticecaseload.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2009); see also Posner, supra note 18, at 36–37. R
270 For reflections on the possible uses of electronic technology to establish visible
contact between judges and parties, see Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to
John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1529–31 (1998).
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Notwithstanding these benefits, we anticipate that the Justices will
not join in urging Congress to adopt our proposal.  Justice White to
the contrary notwithstanding, we have been told that “the Justices are
unanimous in their praise for the virtues of the discretionary
court.”271  On that issue, we can respond with confidence that none of
the Justices bring judicial independence to the question of whether
others should have a say in defining their workload.  They are disqual-
ified to opine on the subject.
CONCLUSION
We do not suppose that our magic wand has produced a panacea,
and we are fully aware that judicial law reform is very difficult to enact;
legend has it that law reform is “no sport for the short-winded.”272
Nevertheless, we advance this scheme for restructuring the certiorari
process firm in the belief that legislation along these lines is much
needed to restore and rehabilitate the judicial function of our most
honored judges.  We foresee no risk of serious adverse consequences
if Justices were required to decide more cases—even some they might
prefer not to decide.  This reduction in what we see as an excess of
judicial independence might over time help to relieve the concerns
voiced by Justices Breyer and O’Connor, among many others.
271 Sternberg, supra note 17, at 14. R
272 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Introduction to THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUN-
CILS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, at xvii, xix (Arthur T. Vanderbilt
ed., 1949).
